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Chapter 1
Tradition, Modernity, and the Confucian Revival:
An Introduction and Literature Review of New Confucian Activism
Introduction
On August 8th, 2008 countless viewers around the globe watched the opening ceremony
of the Beijing Olympics. The ceremony included performers representing the disciples of
Confucius, chanting quotations from The Analects. The Confucian theme was continued as the
performers lifted and lowered individual blocks in a choreographed display. In the end, the
blocks formed the Chinese character he (和), or harmony – a central principle of the Confucian
tradition.1 Clearly, Confucianism was one of the central themes of the opening ceremony. As this
performance was the most watched opening ceremony in the history of the Olympic games, the
CCP sent a calculated message depicting Chinese culture to the globe and to citizens of the PRC.
The opening ceremony was certainly an enormous international declaration of CCP interest in
Confucianism. Perhaps unbeknownst to many viewers around the world, the 2008 Olympic
opening ceremony reflected issues of Chinese cultural identity of great historical import. In fact,
the opening ceremony is illustrative of an intellectual movement aimed at rethinking modernity
through the Confucian tradition, and re-visioning the Confucian tradition to China’s
contemporary context – the Confucian revival.
The Confucian revival refers to the renaissance of Confucianism in the PRC in the liberal
intellectual and political atmosphere of the post-Mao era. The revival refers to increased CCP
interest in studying Confucianism, as well as non-party intellectual activism beginning in the
1980s. This resurgence of Confucianism in the PRC is a ‘revival’ in that Confucianism was
criticized throughout 20th century China as being incompatible with modernity. Particularly in
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the Cultural Revolution, Maoist China persecuted Confucianism as a backward, feudal tradition.
In contrast to the preceding decades, the increased Confucian activism in the 1980s from state
and non-state intellectuals marks a definite revival of Confucianism in the PRC. That said, it is
important to note that ‘revival’ is a misnomer in some ways. ‘Revival’ implies that
Confucianism died during the 20th century, only later to be brought back to life in the PRC.
Certainly, from the onslaught of Western imperialism in the 19th century to the revolutionary
struggles throughout the 20th century, China’s modern period is marked by a backlash against
Confucianism. However, Confucianism never died out completely though it was vehemently
attacked as counter-revolutionary by the leaders of the Communist Revolution under Chairman
Mao Zedong. In fact, the ‘revival’ is only the most recent period of transformation of the
Confucian tradition in the 20th century.
I argue that the Confucian revival is a complex political and intellectual movement that
aims to define China’s cultural and political identity. This movement navigates the tension
between tradition and modernity. Specifically, this movement disputes the idea that tradition and
modernity are diametrically opposed. Rather, the Confucian revival reflects a dialectic
relationship between tradition and modernity. In other words, Confucian revivalists aim to
rethink modernity in terms of the Confucian tradition, and to re-vision the Confucian tradition
for the modern era. The Confucian revival reflects the ability of traditional identity to be
preserved and negotiated in modern society, shaped by a history of Western imperialism.
In order to understand the dialectic between tradition and modernity Chapter Two
examines the transformation of Confucianism from the fall of the Qing dynasty to the post-Mao
era. During this time period China engaged in a modernization project. Certainly, Western
imperialism, technology, and political thought were all instrumental in the downfall of the Qing
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dynasty and subsequent revolutionary movements. However, this does not mean that China’s
modernization is a form of un-checked Westernization. The transformation of Confucianism
throughout modern Chinese history reflects a dialectic between tradition and modernity. In other
words, Confucians throughout 19th and 20th century simultaneously redefine Confucianism for
modernity while also rethinking and critiquing globalization and Westernization. As I will
demonstrate, the reforms of Kang Youwei, the Manifesto of Mou Zongsan and the works of Tu
Weiming, and the presence of new Confucians in the PRC since the 1980s all exemplify this
fact. The Confucian revival is a movement in dialogue with Chinese cultural tradition, as well as
modernity, Westernization, and globalization.
Chapter Three and Chapter Four detail New Confucian activism aimed at re-appraising
the tradition for the modern era during the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century.
These chapters argue that the Confucian revival is a statist and non-statist movement. Chapter
Three, “Towards a Typology of New Confucianism,” characterizes the political ideology of new
Confucian intellectuals in the PRC. Categorizing new Confucian activism in the PRC illustrates
two points about the Confucian revival. First, the new Confucian movement involves the
confluence of state and non-state activism; and second, there is a multiplicity of political
ideology within both statist and non-statist factions. Regarding the first point, this chapter
examines the prevalence of statist and non-statist Confucian activism. ‘Statist’ refers to
intellectuals that have the support and sponsorship of the CCP. ‘Non-statist’, on the other hand,
refers to intellectuals that operate without state sponsorship and often critique the CCP. Statists
and non-statists not only differ in their relationship to the CCP, but also in their views on
Westernization and modernity. For instance, non-statists are critical of any type of Western
political-economic structure, particularly socialism. Furthermore, non-statists believe that
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political Confucianism is the only ideology capable of addressing the social crises created by
modernization. Statists, on the other hand, are interested in reconciling Confucianism and
socialism. As we will see, the Confucian intellectual plays an active, but dichotomous political
role in the contemporary PRC; the Confucian intellectual is involved in statist and non-statist
activism.
Chapter Three also argues that there is a multiplicity of political ideologies within both
statist and non-statist factions. This is demonstrated through a detailed examination of Jiang
Qing and Kang Xiaoguang, two New Confucians with arguably the most exhaustive and
influential vision of political Confucianism. Jiang and Kang both establish their political critique
and reformist vision on the teachings of Classical Confucianism from the Han dynasty. Although
Jiang and Kang are both non-statists new Confucian, they provide two distinct models for
political reform in the PRC, established on two different teachings. Jiang espouses the Gongyang
tradition, emphasizing The Spring and Autumn, a text attributed to Confucius. Kang on the other
hand espouses the teachings of Mencius, particularly the Mencian ideal of benevolent
government. What the new Confucians have in common is a commitment to re-fashioning
China’s tradition in response to fervent modernization and Westernization. This re-appraisal of
Confucianism involves a dynamic and pluralistic political discourse concerning one of China
longest intellectual traditions, Confucianism, and China’s modern reality.
Chapter Four, “New Confucianism, Education, and Politics: The Confucian Revival
movement in Education” addresses the confluence of statist and non-statist activism within
Confucian education. Since the turn of the 21st century the CCP has sponsored a variety of
Confucian education institutions. Namely, Renda (Peoles’ University), a party university, as well
as Beida (Beijing Univesity) and Qinghua, two universities that educate China’s elite, have
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started Confucian schools. Also, the CCP has endorsed a number of private Confucian
academies. The CCP has also shown commitment to the Confucian project through its
promulgation of Confucian principles within moral education policy. The chapter concludes with
a case study of Anqing No.1 Middle School in Anqing, Anhui, China, revealing that Confucian
ideals influence teaching philosophy in public, party affiliated secondary schools. These
examples all demonstrate that the CCP is committed to Confucian education. However, nonparty intelligentsias are also responsible for the movement to implement Confucian education.
The CCP does not mandate participation in these Confucian education programs. Participation in
Confucian learning is due to commitment to Confucian culture on a personal level of party and
non-party intelligentsias.
The contemporary confluence of the state and non-state influences within Confucian
education is a phenomenon with deep historical roots. In the Han dynasty education played an
important role in the creation of the Confucian civil bureaucrat. This civil bureaucracy was vital
to the ruling order of the Han dynasty for four centuries and many centuries thereafter until 1905
when the Confucian exam system was abolished. However, Confucian bureaucrats were more
than instruments of the state. Rather, Confucian bureaucrats questioned the power of the
emperor, holding the state accountable to the Will of Heaven. The Imperial University, a state
institution, confirmed and contested the power and authority of the emperor. Confucian
education and the Confucian intellectual simultaneously functioned as a voice of support and
dissent, directed at the state. The contemporary Confucian revival echoes the traditional
relationship between the Confucian intellectual and the dynastic state, maintaining the same
relationship of legitimizing and challenging state power in the contemporary setting. The CCP
endorsement of Confucianism is a matter of seeking political legitimacy in the post-Mao
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ideological vacuum. At the same time, intelligentsias from within and without the CCP are
engaged in applying this traditional ideology to a modern context with an agenda that does not
always conform to that set by the CCP leadership.
The Confucian revival is an intellectual movement that negotiates the dialectic
relationship between tradition and modernity and between the intellectual and the state. The
revival involves a variety of political ideologies and interpretations of Confucianism engaging
the tradition in global dialogue concerning Chinese modernization. Throughout the movement,
aspects of the Confucian ideology are re-applied to the modern day. Confucian tradition is being
revived not only in ideological substance, but also in the function of the Confucian intellectual in
the PRC. There are statist and non-statist new Confucian intellectuals, much like the role of the
Confucian intellectual throughout Chinese history.
The following historiography will frame my arguments within the context of scholarly
research on new Confucianism and the Confucian revival.

Historiography
This introduction began with the image of the 2008 Olympic opening ceremony for
several reasons. Certainly, the goal was to start with an image that is recent and globally
witnessed in order to express the relevance of Confucianism in the contemporary setting. This
image serves as a present day anchor for a historical issue. I also began with the Olympic
opening ceremony because it was an event that attracted the attention of the U.S. government to
the Confucian revival. This historiography begins with a discussion of the U.S. reaction to the
Confucian revival described in “The Confucian Revival in the Propaganda Narratives of the
Chinese Government.” The U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission (USCESC)
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published this report in July of 2011 to explain CCP support of Confucianism in events such as
the Olympic ceremony.
As the title suggests, the U.S. government is interested in the Confucian revival. The
report argues that the CCP is reviving Confucianism as propaganda. The report states,
In the face of widespread public cynicism regarding traditional Communist ideology, the
Party has undertaken a search for an alternative philosophical tradition that could appeal
to the public without contradicting the Party’s continuing use of official Marxist theories
on politics and social development.2
In this sense, the revival of Confucianism is instrumental to continuing the ideological legitimacy
of the CCP. Certainly the CCP is invested in Confucianism. This is demonstrated in this report
through the Olympic games as well as the production of a movie about Confucius in 2009
by a CCP owned movie company, and the erection of a statue of Confucius in Tiananmen
Square in 2011.3 However, this report only acknowledges the CCP rhetoric that is involved in
the Confucian revival, presenting the revival as a CCP movement. In contrast, this thesis will
demonstrate that contrary to the USCESC, the Confucian revival involves a multiplicity of
voices from China and around the globe. The revival is part of a complex history of China’s
modernization, Westernization, and globalization.
The Confucian revival cannot be understood as a trend in CCP propaganda, but as the
most recent period of transformation of the Confucian tradition in the 20th century. Tu Weiming,
a Confucian scholar and New Confucian intellectual, provides a detailed account of the evolution
of the Confucian tradition throughout Chinese history including the contemporary setting. Tu
asserts that Confucianism is a “living tradition.”4 This means that throughout the history of the
tradition, Confucian intellectuals have defined and re-defined Confucianism in response to the
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changing political and social dimensions of China’s history. To argue that Confucianism is a
static, un-evolving tradition would imply China’s history is devoid of intellectual transformation.
This notion of a static Confucian tradition is the backdrop that Tu is arguing against. 20th
century Sinologists such as Joseph Levenson argued, “the incongruity between Confucian
traditionalism and rational, scientific modernism is so clear-cut that the rise of modernity in
China entails the demise of the Confucian tradition.”5 Tu refutes this perception of Confucianism
in his publication “Towards a Third Epoch of Confucian Humanism.”
Contesting the work of Levenson, Tu presents a historical picture of the transformation of
Confucianism. Tu argues that three distinct epochs mark the evolution of Confucianism
throughout the dynastic period of Chinese history. The first epoch, Classical Confucianism dates
from Confucius (551-479 BCE) to Dong Zhongshu (195-105 BCE). Tu writes, “the politicization
of Confucian moral values characterized much of the dynamics of the Han governing
mechanism.”6 This means that during the classical epoch, Confucianism gained political and
social prominence. Tu argues that the evolution of Confucianism continued after the fall of Han.
He asserts that through the Sui (581-618) and Tang (618-907) dynasties Confucian scholarship
flourished. This is exemplified by the addition of “commentaries and subcommentaries” to the
Confucian classics.7 The Confucian tradition entered the second epoch during the tenth century
Song dynasty. During this time period Neo-Confucian thought emerged in response to the
prominence of Taoism and Buddhism.8 Neo-Confucianism, the second epoch, stretches from the
beginning of the Song in the 10th century to the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Neo-

5

Tu, Weiming. Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual. Albany: State University of New
York, 1993. pp. 143
6 Ibid., pp. 147
7 Ibid., pp. 148
8 Ibid., pp. 149

8

Confucianism was marked by an expansion of the Confucian cannon, absorption of Taoism and
Buddhism, and the spread of Confucianism across other East Asian countries, namely Japan,
Korea, and Vietnam.9
Tu believes that in spite of the backlash against Confucianism during the 19th and 20th
centuries, Confucian intellectuals continued to creatively transform the tradition. Tu praises
Carsun Zhang (1886-1969), Mou Zongsan (1909-1905), and Tang Junyi (1909-1978) for their
contributions to and defense of Confucianism during the 20th century.10 As preeminent as
Zhang, Mou, and Tang were, Tu argues that the Confucian tradition will inevitably continue to
evolve. Tu asserts that modernity has raised a number of questions that Confucian intellectuals
have yet to resolve. For instance he writes, “the real challenge… is how a revived Confucian
humanism might answer the question that science and democracy have raised.”11 Tu thus posited
a third epoch of new Confucianism. Concerning reviving Confucianism Tu writes,“Reanimating
the old to attain the new is surely still possible in Confucian symbolism, but to do so the modern
Confucian must again be original and creative, no matter how difficult the task and how
strenuous the effort.”12 Tu believes that the third epoch of the Confucian tradition involves the
Confucian revival. This revival must involve not only an application of tradition to modernity,
but also the creative evolution of the tradition.
“Towards a Third Epoch of Confucian Humanism” was published in 1993. At the time of
its publication, the CCP had already begun showing interest in reviving Confucianism. For
instance, the CCP founded the China Confucius Foundation in 1984 with headquarters in
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Beijing, the capital of the PRC. Furthermore the CCP endorsed the celebration of Confucius’
birthday starting in 1987.13 Fang Keli, Dean of Graduate Studies at the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences and member of the Office of Academic Degrees Committee of the State Council,
exemplifies well CCP political investment in Confucianism in the post-Mao era. Fang lead two
CCP-funded Confucian research projects from 1986 to 1990 and from 1990 to 1995, resulting in
the publication of over 400 papers and numerous other works.14 During this same period of time,
new Confucian scholars furthered their Confucian scholarship without the sponsoship of the
state. Namely, Jiang Qing, a New Confucian that I will discuss at length in the third chapter,
published Confucian scholarship during the 1980s. In the twenty years since Tu’s publication,
the statist and non-statist Confucian activism has flourished. I argue that the Confucian revival
has entered the third epoch that Tu predicted twenty years ago. CCP rhetoric as well as nonParty Confucian activism are all part of the current creative transformation of the Confucian
tradition in the present day. Tu’s article provides a detailed historical lens that situates the
Confucian revival as an ongoing development of the tradition, navigating the pressures of
modernization and globalization.
John Makeham’s New Confucianism: A Critical Examination, published in 2003, also
provides a historical lens for understanding the Confucian revival. Professor of classical Chinese
language and culture at Australia National University, Makeham provides a definition of new
Confucianism and the Confucian Revival, and also contributes to the new Confucian discourse.
Makeham is worth quoting at length on the difference between New Confucianism and the
Confucian Revival. He argues: “a differentiation needs to be made between Confucian
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revivalism – a conservative cultural phenomenon that has taken on a variety of forms throughout
the twentieth century – and a distinct philosophical movement with its own self-identity, which
has promoted itself, and became identified as, New Confucianism.”15 According to Makeham,
new Confucianism and the Confucian revival have been conflated. The Confucian Revival is a
cultural movement that has been developing since the May Fourth Era in the early twentieth
century. Starting as early as the Opium Wars some Chinese intellectuals and officials began to
question Confucianism and eventually led a state initiated series of reforms in the late Qing that
dismantled Confucianism from its position as state doctrine. However, other Chinese
intellectuals and officials began to look to Confucianism as a source of cultural identity with
answers to the nation’s contemporary problems. Makeham defines Confucian revivalism as a
strictly cultural force, whereas New Confucianism is a unique, self-identifying philosophical
movement that began in the 1980’s in Mainland China and Taiwan. These New Confucians
focus on particular issues within Confucianism, such as moral-metaphysics, in addition to
societal problems. Most importantly, Makeham argues that the 1980s is the beginning of selfidentification within this movement.
In order to substantiate the difference between these cultural and philosophical
phenomena, Makeham details a historical development of Confucianism in the 20th century.
As stated above, Makeham asserts that new Confucianism itself began in the 1980’s. However,
a number of scholars identify Confucians of the earlier 20th century as the founders of this
philosophical school. For instance, Fang Keli, a New Confucian and scholar, identifies Liang
Shuming, Zhang Junmai, Mou Zongsan, among others as the leaders during the initial period
of New Confucianism.16 Makeham’s distinction between a cultural conservationist force
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and philosophical movement is useful for a critical examination of the modern philosophical
arguments. Moreover it is important to understand when in the 20th century the groups selfidentified, so as to avoid retrospectively applying terminology. Most importantly, the fact that
Confucians began to self-identify as ‘New Confucians’ in the 1980s, reflects an evolution of the
Confucian tradition throughout the 20th century. Unlike the USCESC report, which focuses on
CCP rhetoric Makeham’s work demonstrates that the Confucian revival has evolved throughout
China’s modern history.
Like Makeham, Yen Ching-Hwang attempts to historicize the development of the
Confucian revival. As a history professor at the National University of Singapore and publisher
of “The Confucian Revival Movement in Singapore and Malaya, 1899-1911,” Yen argues the
Confucian Revival begins at the end of the 19th century. Yen posits that Kang Youwei and
the Hundred Days Reforms established the revival movement in Mainland China. Although
the movement was ultimately defeated, Kang attempted to establish Confucianism as state
doctrine, and enlist numerous reforms to restructure and preserve the Qing dynasty.17 The
Hundred Days reform is an early example of reappraising Confucianism to strengthen China in
the wake of imperialist forces and weakening dynastic power. By declaring this the beginning
of the Confucian revival, Yen situates the revival as a response to Western domination and
modernization.
Confucian Revivalism continued after the fall of the Qing dynasty as well.
According to Yen, one hundred and thirty cities across China were home to “Confucian
revivalist activities.”18 Such activities include, but are not necessarily limited to, publication of
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magazines discussing the importance of Confucianism and the creation of cult Confucian groups.
Also, the constitution of the Republic of China states that “Confucian principles shall be the
basis for the cultivation of character in national education.”19 Yen holds the above examples to
demonstrate the strength of the Revival movement during the fall of the Qing and early
Republican period. Yen’s assessment of the revival presents that Confucianism was not
eradicated with the actions of the iconoclasts, fall of the dynastic system, and search for ‘new
cultural spirit’ after the fall of the Qing dynasty. Modernity in China is not a function of
unchecked Western dominance, but a process in which traditional cultural identity negotiated
and challenged Western notions of modernity. Yen’s discussion of turn of the century Confucian
conservatism presents how Confucians asserted and negotiated it’s standing in Chinese society.
Yen’s work asserts that the revival was involved in defining China’s cultural identity during turn
of the 20th century in response to modernization and Westernization. This discussion also
situates new Confucian activism during the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries as
an extension of the earlier cultural conservationist efforts. Unlike the U.S.-China Economic
Security Commission report, Yen’s work contextualizes the Confucian revival as a phenomenon
that has stretched over a century of Chinese history.
Whereas Makeham and Yen define the Confucian revival as part of China’s history of
modernization and Westernization, William Theodore de Bary discusses the Confucian revival
within the context of globalization. In Confucian Tradition and Global Education, the NeoConfucian scholar and Professor of Chinese History at Columbia University, argues that the
Confucian revival is a movement that simultaneously influences and is influenced by
globalization. The Confucian Revival is situated in the current global economic context, while
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also offering a critique of that context. De Barry writes, “Since East Asia itself is now part of the
larger world community, and deeply enmeshed in the global economy and technology,
Confucian education will have to be seen first as based in local tradition, next as connected to
East Asia, and then adapted to the larger world.”

20

De Barry suggests it is important to

recognize the need to protect cultural identity from the tide of globalization, and create a system
in which local traditions define globalization and modernization. de Barry coins the
term “glocalization” to express the synthesis of local and global society.
deBary argues that globalization creates a number of cultural crises. Namely, technology
and consumerism pose a serious threat to culture and democracy all over the globe21. de Bary
believes that the Confucian Revival is in many ways a response to the problems posed by
globalization of democratic and economic practices. de Barry defines the Confucian revival as an
example of glocalization, as it involves local (in this case East Asian) cultural tradition in
connection with the larger global context. With the economic growth in East Asia in the end of
the twentieth century scholars throughout East Asia argued that there is more than one model of
democratic and economic development. For instance, de Bary cites Lee Kuan Yew’s argument
for ‘Asian Values’ in East Asian political practice. Lee, as former president of Singapore, asserts
observance of Neo-Confucian principles is necessary for successful development of Singapore22.
de Barry asserts that Lee’s participation in the Asian Values debate is an example of
glocalization with the Confucian tradition. Confucianism, the local tradition, was synthesized
with contemporary global economic context of Singapore. However, de Barry also crticizes Lee
for un-democratic practices in Singapore, using traditional cultural differences as the justification
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for different governmental practices. de Bary asserts that Lee’s argument is based on cultural
relativism and are not capable of addressing the issues posed by globalization. This demonstrates
that de Barry defines the Confucian revival within the context of globalization, discussing its
significance for the development of East Asia.
de Bary claims that revitalizing global education based on the local traditions and
cultures of a region is necessary to combat the challenges of globalization. He cites an example
of this within the Confucian revival. The New Asia College in Hong Kong was founded in 1949
as an academy (shuyuan 书院), a humanistic educational institution based on Song dynasty
Neo-Confucian schools. Tang Junyi, founder of the New Asia College, opposed the forces of
modern education in many ways. First, historically, the school was founded the year that the
Communists defeated the KMT in the Civil War on Mainland China, leading to an exodus of
Confucian thinkers from China. Second, Tang asserted the three pillars of the New Asia College
education were, “1) Our Own Heritage; (2) Nature, Technology, and the Environment; and
(3) Self and Humanity.”23 Rather than assume the importance of modernization, technology,
and westernization, Tang wanted the traditional style academy or shuyuan to provide a global
education while critically re-examining the content of the global education. This system directly
opposes the University system, which it later became a part of, which as a college (xueyuan 学院
) focused on content, competition, and the economy.
Similar to de Bary, Daniel Bell and Hahm Chaibong discuss Confucianism providing a
critique of unchecked liberal democracy and economics in East Asia. Bell and Chaibong
write, “the essays presented in [Confucianism for the Modern World] thus represent…efforts to
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modernize Confucianism and Confucianism modernity at the same time.”24 Much like de Bary’s
discussion of the globalization, Bell and Chaibong present the interplay between modernity and
Confucianism. Bell and Chaibong assert present a collection of contemporary third generation
New Confucians throughout East Asia that demonstrates the continued practice of Confucianism.
These New Confucians not only discuss Classical and Neo-Confucian texts, but also “investigate
linkages between Confucian ideals and concrete practices/ institutions, be they political,
economic, social, or legal”25In other words, Bell and Chaibong argue the Confucian revival is
not isolated to philosophical readings of classical texts, but involves practicing and
institutionalizing Confucian values. However, it is neither possible, nor within the scope Bell’s
work to identify all of the Confucian values alive today. Rather, like De Barry, Bell and
Chaibong indicate that the Confucian Revival is in a project addressing the problems concerning
globalization and modernity.
According to Bell and Chaibong reexamination is common throughout the historical
development of the Confucian tradition. They argue, “what we are doing is rearticulating
Confucianism for our modern world in the same way Confucians of the past rearticulated it for
theirs.”26 Bell and Chaibong both present and participate in the current transformation of the
Confucian tradition known as the Confucian Revival. Confucianism for the Modern World offers
two arguments about this new epoch of Confucianism. First, that Confucianism and modernity
are compatible, and second, that both Confucianism and modernity require critique and
transformation. Bell and Chaibong explicitly examine traditional values, offering a defense or
critique of their application today. Bell and Chaibong’s argument for the compatibility of
24
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Confucianism is similar to De Barry’s argument in Confucian Tradition and Global Education
and Makeham’s work in New Confucianism: A Critical Examination. Each of the authors not
only argue for the necessity of, but also participate in the transformation of the tradition. In doing
so each of the authors critique globalization, modernity, in present day society. In this regard
Bell and Chaibong agree with De Barry’s argument regarding the imperfections of modernity
and globalization.
Bell and Chaibong also assert the need for transformation of Confucianism along with
modernity. They write, “…we are…reviving Confucianism for the modern world by bringing
about a creative synthesis between the two.”27

In this way modernity is incomplete, but

Confucianism requires reinvention as well. As such Bell and Chaibong are practicing de Barry’s
theory of a new global education, by using a local context or tradition to reexamine the global
issues such as democracy, economics, law, human rights, and other issues. This reinvention
of Confucianism reflects many of the broader, global questions raised by Makeham, Yen,
and de Barry. Confucianism for the Modern World embodies the questions at the heart of this
paper. Specifically, this paper will address how this interplay between tradition, modernity and
globalization developed throughout the 20th century history of the Confucian Revival and will
historicize the cultural development that leads to modern reinvention of Confucianism.
The works of Tu, Makeham, Yen, de Bary, Bell and Chaibong are instrumental in
defining the Confucian revival. The above discussion demonstrates that the Confucian revival
reflects a complex history involving modernization, Westernization, and globalization in China.
However, these scholars also demonstrate the complexity of voices that are currently engaged in
the Confucian revival discourse. Scholars Makeham, de Barry and Bell are Westerners –

27Bell,

26.
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Makeham is Australian, de Bary is American, and Bell is Canadian. Tu Weiming was born in
Mainland China, but then moved to Taiwan after the KMT retreated in 1949. Tu was then
educated in Taiwan and eventually Harvard University. Tu has lived and taught in the United
States for the majority of his career. As a Chinese man, Tu has engaged the Western world in the
Confucian tradition and the Confucian revival. Furthermore, as a Confucian, Tu has not only
been a scholar but also a participant in the creative transformation of the Confucian tradition.
Yen Ching-Hwang was also born in Mainland China before the CCP defeated the KMT in the
20th century. Yen was educated in Confucianism in Singapore. Lastly, Hahm Chaibong is a
South Korean scholar. Contrary to the USCESC report, the Confucian revival is not simply a
movement isolated to the contemporary CCP. The Confucian revival not only involves the
history of Westernization and Globalization in China, but also engages a global discourse.
The question remains, what does the Confucian Revival reflect about the hegemonic
trends of modernity and globalization? In other words, does Confucianism reflect the ability of
traditional identity to be preserved and negotiated in modern society, shaped by a history of
Western imperialism? Or does the Confucian Revival indicate the unchecked dominance of
modernization and disregard for tradition, to the extent that traditional culture serves the interests
of modernity in Mainland China? In the chapters that follow I will argue that the transformation
of Confucianism throughout the 20th century reflects the negotiation with, not the unchecked
dominance of, globalization and modernization. I assert that the Confucian Revival reflects that
Chinese identity in the present day navigates between the twin poles of cultural traditions and
global forces. In this way I argue that a dialect operating between tradition and modernity shapes
Chinese cultural identity in the 20th century. The Confucian revival demonstrates the ability of
traditional culture to participate in global discourse. I will address the historical tension between
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the Confucian tradition, modernization and Westernization throughout 19th and 20th century
China in Chapter Two. Drawing on the works of Makeham, Sen, and Tu, this chapter will
demonstrate that Confucian revival is part of a dialogue between cultural tradition and modernity
throughout China’s recent history. Chapter Three and Chapter Four will present the confluence
of Party and non-Party activism in the Confucian revival. These chapters will demonstrate that
this relationship between statist and non-statist Confucian intellectuals is a historical trend in the
Confucian revival. This means that Confucianism is not being revived only in ideals, but the
historical role of the Confucian intellectual is also being revived in contemporary China.
Together these chapters will demonstrate that the Confucian revival is a movement negotiating
the tension between tradition, modernity and globalization. This negotiation is pluralistic,
involving a complexity of voices attempting to re-envision China’s Confucian tradition for the
modern era.

19

Works Cited
Bell, Daniel, and Chae-bong Ham. Confucianism for the Modern World. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge UP, 2003.
Bresciani, Umberto. Reiventing Confucianism. Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute for Chinese Studies,
2001.
De, Bary William Theodore. Confucian Tradition and Global Education. Hong Kong: Chinese
UP, 2007.
Jiawen, Ai. "Two Sides of One Coin: The Party's Attitude Toward Confucianism in
Contemporary China." The Journal of Contemporary China (2009):
Makeham, John. New Confucianism: a Critical Examination. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2003
Tu, Weiming. Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual. Albany: State
University of New York, 1993
U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, July 20, 2011.
Yen, Ching-Hwang. "The Confucian Revival Movement in Singapore and Malaya, 1899-1911."
Journal of South East Asian Studies 7.1 (1976)

20

Chapter 2
Historical Background:
The Transformation of Confucianism in Modern Chinese History
Understanding the scope and complexity of Chinese modernity is a daunting task. This is
because a century and a half of imperialism, revolution, and economic development is not
a ‘Chinese’ history alone. Rather, the social transformation from the Opium Wars to the era of
reform under Deng Xiaoping reflects an ever-evolving process of defining and redefining
identity within a global context. The transformation of the Confucian tradition is demonstrative
of this fact. Confucianism was a primary organizational force for Chinese politics, culture,
religion, and education for millennia. However, this paper challenges the assumption that
Confucianism is a relic of Chinese dynastic history. As Chinese political, economic, and social
milieu has changed, Confucianism, as a living staple of Chinese cultural identity, has changed
too. This paper will examine significant events in the last two centuries of Chinese history to
demonstrate how Confucianism has changed and remained pertinent in the discussion of Chinese
modernity. Focusing on Confucianism will therefore provide the breadth of the social changes,
as well as depth into one facet of Chinese culture. This examination will serve to illustrate
several points. First, the process of definition and redefinition is one of navigating Chinese
domestic and traditional identities as well as China’s relationship with the Western world.
However, this does not mean that Chinese cultural identity is one subject to strict binaries, such
as tradition and modernity or China and the West. The transformation of Confucianism
demonstrates the fluidity of such binaries. In other words, Chinese modernity is not traditional or
modern. Such an analysis of imperialist history and cultural transformation is categorically
limited. With that, this paper will begin with an examination of the one of the most formative
memories in Chinese-Western history - the Opium War.
21

The Opium War was a product of several centuries of changing and frustrated trade
relations between China and several European powers. In fact, the Spanish, Dutch, Italian, and
British established trade in the Pacific, including China, during the 16th century. While many
European traders were restricted to coastal regions, many Jesuits reached China’s interior.
Specifically, following Matteo Ricci’s mission to Beijing in 1601, both Dominican and
Franciscan missionaries proselytized in China. However, the Chinese Empire also played an
active role in this growing East-West relationship by strictly controlling where and how
Europeans could trade in China. For instance, in 1685 the Chinese Emperor reopened four
trading ports. While both the Qing dynasty and European states played active roles in this
relationship, it was not without frustrated cross-cultural obstacles. The Confucian belief that
merchants are the lowest social strata posed the first obstacle. Although Europe was
economically expanding during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries due to merchants, exploration
and industrialization, China had little interest in merchants and trade relations. Instead, as R.
Keith Schoppa confirms, “China was ‘everything under Heaven,’ by definition self-sufficient,
and therefore needing nothing from outside”28. Furthermore, China viewed trade as a form of
tributary to the Emperor, rather than a simple economic enterprise. Not only did Confucianism
degrade the social standing of the European merchants, but the dynastic worldview also impeded
the economic expansion that European traders pursued.
Between the European industry and trade and the Chinese tributary practices, China and
Britain spoke two different economic and diplomatic languages. Following such frustrations the
British sent several diplomatic missions to Beijing to discuss the restricted role of trade in China.
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The Macartney mission of 1793,
took scientists and artists in an entourage of 100 on a 66-gun man-of-war plus two
escort vessels loaded with examples of British manufacturing technology that the
Qing promptly labeled ‘tribute from England.’ The Industrial Revolution was gaining
momentum, but remained quite unknown to the senescent Qianlong Emperor. The British
requests for broader trade opportunities under a published tariff, as well as diplomatic
representation at Beijing, were an invitation to China to join the modern word then being
born. Beijing politely turned it all down.29
The Macartney mission was not the first or last attempt by the British to expand trade relations.
The Chinese empire denied both James Flint in 1759 and Lord Amherst in 1816.30 However,
the British were also economically frustrated. As the British lacked resources the Chinese
desired, the British suffered from unbalanced trade. Without goods to trade the British paid for
commodities with silver. In fact, “the annual flow of silver into China reached over three million
taels in the 1760s but soared to sixteen million twenty years later.”31 With unsustainable trade
frustrating diplomatic relationships, the British began to import opium into China as a remedy.
As a cheap drug, opium offered the British more economic benefits than trading with silver.
Also, as highly addictive substance, the British were able to increase demand of the Chinese
population to trade with Britain. Opium trade gave Britain the upper hand in the economic
relationship, and weakened the ability of the Chinese government to control the trading ports.
The importation of opium and ensuing military conflict with Britain carried more than
economic and diplomatic significance. In fact the Opium War proved the Chinese empire
incompetent in diplomacy and warfare, as well as enforcing its own edicts domestically. The

29

Fairbank, John King, and Merle Goldman. China a New History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard
UP, 1998: pp. 196-7
30 Schoppa, R. Keith. Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006: pp. 48
Fairbank, John King, and Merle Goldman. China a New History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP,
1998: pp. 197
31 Schoppa, R. Keith. Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006: pp. 51

23

Daoguang emperor reacted promptly to the importation scheme by banning the importation and
smuggling of opium through a number of edicts. However, the emperor was unable to eradicate
the smuggling of opium completely, and even officials commonly used opium. Furthermore,
opium reversed the trade imbalance and the Chinese government suffered economic turmoil with
the amount of silver being paid to Britain. The resulting loss in the armed conflict was also an
overwhelming embarrassment for the Chinese. Lastly, the war ended with the establishment of
the Treaty of Nanjing, which resulted in foreign concessions.32 Not only was this treaty unequal
given that the Chinese received nothing in exchange, but the resulting foreign concessions
allowed for extraterritoriality, and differing to foreign authority within the concession areas.
After the Opium War the Qing dynasty appeared domestically and internationally impotent. Not
only did the government have a difficult time regulating opium before the conflict, but the
unequal treaties left the government powerless to Western states within the concessions. This
doubt in the Qing government is one of the most formative events in the end of dynastic China.
Moreover, the embarrassment of the concessions resulted in an increase of thought regarding
new Chinese national spirit and ways in which to strengthen the nation. In the end, the Opium
War was not the simple, bloody opening of China. Rather, this conflict reflects centuries of SinoEuropean relations, cross-cultural frustrations, and the transformation of the inter-state relations
and Chinese identity in an increasingly globalized world.
Throughout the decline of the Qing, China’s scholars and elite underwent dramatic
intellectual change to contend with the challenges posed by the Western powers. Like any other
Chinese dynasty, the Qing inherited a long history of Confucian Classics including numerous
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philosophical texts and a canon that was entrenched in Chinese rulership for millennia. However,
during the Qing many scholars began to interact with classics in a new way. Specifically, the
Qing gave rise to the New Text movement, where, “Scholars were, ‘dissatisfied with the
unverifiable ideas that had pervaded’ Song and Ming interpretations of Confucianism.”33 In
other words, Confucian scholars began to reinterpret and reanalyze texts. This reflects that
during a time of great change, and challenges from the West scholars looked into the Confucian
tradition for answers. Regarding this reappropriation of classical texts, Fairbanks and Goldman
write,
By the 1840s the sudden triumph of seapower led to the drawing together of two lines of
Chinese reformist thought – the New Text movement…and the statecraft movement for
the scholar-official to become more involved and more effective in administration. 34
For many scholar officials and elite during the 19th century, Chinese culture appeared to
have the answers for their societal problems. However, this reappraisal of Confucian Classics
from within the Qing dynasty demonstrates that Confucian tradition in China is not static, but
actively questioned and changing. The New Text Movement shows that on the elite level, the
Confucian canon was reinterpreted, transformed, contested, and shaped by scholars confronted
by international affairs and domestic turmoil.
Intellectual change and reform affected more than the reading of texts. For instance, the
Self-Strengthening movement addressed the structural political, military, and technological
disparity between China and Western powers. Many scholars held that although the West and
Japan were barbarous, Chinese civilization was no match for Western military technology. As
such Li Hongzhang, a major leader in the movement, said, “I firmly believe that to strengthen
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herself as a nation, China must learn Western technology.”35 However, this technology was only
a means, or yong (用), to uphold the Chinese essence, ti (体). In fact, yong and ti became the
backbone of the self-strengthening platform. However, Li and other Self-Strengtheners such as
Zeng Guofan faced critique from other literati as well as set backs from several armed conflicts.
Specifically, defeats in the Sino-French conflict of 1884 and the Sino-Japanese war of 18941895 proved the reform movement an embarrassing failure. It appeared again that the Qing
government did not have the means to reform and develop technology comparable to the West.
However, this era of reform reflects Chinese thinkers actively pursuing independent
means to survival while maintaining traditional cultural identity. As a result two important
dialogues transformed Chinese culture – internal and external. First, scholars debated China’s
internal ideology. This is shown through the debates surrounding the New Text movement. The
second dialogue was external between East and West. The dichotomy of China and the West
shaped the modern era of Chinese identity. The Self-Strengthener’s notion of Substance and
Function (ti-yong 体用) argued that China was in fact superior to the West, in spite of the
decades of military and technological defeat. Substance and Function was the notion that
Chinese culture should be preserved as the ‘Substance’ of China’s cultural identity. However,
given the defeats of the Opium War, Western technology would be utilized for its ‘Function.’
They argued that genuine Chinese cultural identity should be valued over the West, but China
could only be preserved through Western technological and political developments. Thus
Chinese scholars and officials struggled to create and implement a new Chinese national
narrative that was informed simultaneously by tradition and modernity, by the West and China.
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Confucian scholar Kang Youwei’s role in the reform movement perfectly reflects this
tension between tradition and modernity in China. Kang grounded his reform ideology in the
New Text interpretations of Confucianism. Kang’s reform movement targeted Confucian
orthodoxy. However, its goal was to create “a new reformist tradition derived from
Confucianism” and “Kang introduced new ideas under a Confucian cover or enlisted Confucius
as a companion in reformist campaigns.”36 For instance, Kang argued that existing NeoConfucian interpretations of Confucian Classics were flawed. Kang directly criticizes existing
orthodoxy, but believed in reforming Confucianism as part of Qing reforms. Kang sought to reimagine the Confucian tradition to address China’s modernity.
Kang’s political life also reflects the tensions between tradition and modernity of the
reform era. Kang was a member of the literati and passed the jinshi exam, becoming a scholar
elite. This means that Kang was classically trained in Confucian universities. However, even
before the Hundred Days Reforms of 1898, Kang lobbied for modernizing Chinese
governmental structure. Kang “proposed a thorough remodeling of the Qing state, arguing that
superficial borrowing from the West without a fundamental change of the political structure
would be insufficient to make China wealthy and powerful.”37 Kang’s reforms were comprised
of transforming the understanding of Confucius as well as the governmental structures of the
Qing. As such, Kang Youwei demonstrates an attempt to transform the Confucian tradition to
save China. However, some Confucian literati contested these reforms, as officials debated the
reappropriation of the canon and government structures during the end of the 19th century.
The Empress Dowager resisted Kang’s “Hundred Days Reform” and attempted to
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centralize power and control throughout her rule. The Empress lead the Qing court to major
reforms during the last decade of the dynasty. As the Empress attempted to modernize political
structure, military, technological, and economic capability, the educational system also changed.
Before 1905, the Qing dynasty relied on the Confucian exam system to educate civil bureaucrats
and elite of the dynasty. By 1904 the Qing decreed a new educational model, “set up in counties,
prefectures, and provinces, with a Japanese-style of old and new subjects,” however, “it was
soon found that students would continue to aim mainly at the old examinations as a more
prestigious and much cheaper route of advancement.”38 As a result, the Qing court abolished the
Confucian examination system in 1905 in order to establish fundamental change by
modernizing, in fact Westernizing, education. This edict alone created a watershed of political,
social, educational, and intellectual transformation in China.
The Confucian exam system was the backbone to the dynastic Chinese government and
society. Not only was the examine system central to educating the ruling elite, but it also
conferred the Confucian canon and its centrality in Chinese politics and culture. However, its
abolition,
…stopped production of the degree-holding elite, the gentry class. The old order was
losing its intellectual foundation and therefore its philosophical cohesion, while the
student class that replaced it would be buffeted by discordant fragments of Chinese and
Western thought.39
This paradigm shift is significant in several ways. First, the ruling dynasty no longer supported
Confucianism as state doctrine. Until 1905 Confucianism influenced the language of reform
for modern China. For instance, Kang Youwei was a Confucian literati, and Confucianism was
central to the cultural essence that reformers attempted to preserve. However the abolition of
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this examine admonished Confucian doctrine in the ruling elite. Second, as the above quote
mentions, this left the ruling elite without one solidified ideological framework. The old doctrine
was not replaced by an organized cohesive system. Rather, a new generation of elite and students
were left contending with Chinese and Western thought in the process of shaping a new Chinese
ideology. Combined with political upheaval, turn of the 20th century China was not only in a
governmental, but an ideological revolution as well.
In the ideological vacuum following the abolition of the Confucian exams, thinkers such
as Chen Duxiu began a new era of political and cultural identity. Furthermore, such new identity
directly criticized traditional Confucian norms. Works such as “Call to Youth” exemplify Chen’s
emphasis on the new generation of Chinese to establish a modern China. Chen addressed
China’s youth at a pivotal time, as “Call to Youth” was published in 1915, ten years after the end
of the Confucian exam system. Young men at this time were radically disconnected from
traditional Confucian education. In the decade following the abolition of the Confucian exam,
not only were Chinese youth devoid of traditional educational systems, but they also witnessed
the complete fall of the Qing and the republican revolution. Such developments resulted in the
introduction of Western political thought, such as constitutionalism, democracy, and citizenship.
Chen, like other thinkers of his time, believed that Western thought was the key to
modernization. With this, Chen encouraged youth to sever any connection to Confucian thought.
He writes, “out of every ten youths who are young in both age and physique, nine are old in
mentality.”40 Thus, Chen argues that it is the mental attitude that must change in China, and he
makes a plea to the youth to seize this moment and completely leave the old China behind. As
such, Chen lays out a critique of Confucian culture, arguing that Confucianism is incompatible
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with the modernization necessary to cope with the new international and national issues China
faced. Chen creates a tactful metaphor for societal progress to demonstrate this point. He
writes, “The function of youth in society is the same as that of a fresh and vital cell in a human
body. In the process of metabolism, the old and the rotten are incessantly eliminated to be
replaced by the fresh and living…”41 In Chen’s conception, the continuation of traditional values
blocks societal progress like “old” or “rotten” cells in the body stopping new growth. And
similar to the human body, “old” elements are unable to sustain life and lead to the death of
Chinese society. This is because old elements refer to the Confucian hierarchy that Chen
believes suffocates new ideas that can save the country.
Specifically, Chen critiques the formalism of the Confucian tradition, and argues for
modern China to embrace ‘Western’ progressive scientific rationalism. Chen writes, “Empty
formalism was emphasized in the Rites of Chou, and under the Han dynasty Confucianism and
Taoism…were elevated to high positions, while schools of thought were interdicted.” 42 For
Chen, Confucian rites support oppressive, feudalistic social hierarchies. Furthermore, this
formalism cannot be questioned or changed within tradition. As such, Confucianism impedes
progressive thinking necessary to advance the nation. For instance, regarding Chinese and
western medicine Chen writes, “they can only parrot the talk about the five elements…and
prescribe medicine according to ancient formulae.”43 Clearly, Confucianism does not contain the
critical objective thinking skills that are necessary of a modern nation. With this language of
critique, Chen and attempted to redefine Chinese identity. In fact, this task of redefinition
consumed every revolutionary party in China during the twentieth century.
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In keeping with the tradition of Chen Duxiu and May Fourth Movement writers, Mao
Zedong focused the Communist Party on the production of new socialist culture, and critique of
old, backwards traditional culture. Mao Zedong’s Talk at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and
Art in 1942 reflects the first chapter in the communist re-appraisal of Chinese culture. Like the
other revolutionary movements in China, culture played a highly political, central role in the
struggle of the Communist party. The politicization of culture is shown when Mao opens the
1942 forum saying, “In our struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people there are carious
fronts, among which there are the fronts of the pen and of the gun, the cultural and the military
fronts.”44 Mao sought transformation of the cultural milieu in China in order to aid the process of
revolution. Therefore just as the efforts of the gun would overthrow the bourgeoisie, the pen was
also necessary to transform and revolutionize Chinese cultural identity.
This revolutionary culture was therefore oriented towards class struggle in order to aid
the Communist efforts. As such Mao says,
Writers and artists should study society, that is to say, should study the various classes
in society, their mutual relations and respective conditions…only when we grasp all
this…can we have a literature and art that is rich in content and correct in orientation. 45
Clearly, Mao attempted to forge political and cultural cohesion. Therefore, Mao did not
only say that society should be studied; rather he distinctly emphasized class awareness. In
addition to making ideological intent explicit, Mao also argues that literature should have a
transformative affect on the struggle. He argued that peasants, workers, and soldiers fighting for
the communists, “…are eagerly demanding a widespread campaign of enlightenment, education,
and works of literature and art that meet their urgent needs and that are easy to absorb in order
to heighten their enthusiasm in the struggle and confidence in victory.”46 Mao believed culture
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should highlight the importance of the war in order to maintain the persistence of the people
waging it. This speech reveals that from early in the history of the Communist party, culture is
used to tow the party line. From late Qing through early republican history culture has played
an explicit role in Chinese political developments. International influence and internal debate,
reform, and activism also shaped culture throughout China’s modern history. However, the
Communist relationship to mass culture is distinct from early in the twentieth-century where
culture was radically changing under numerous influences without a political unity. This
example of early Mao Zedong thought reflects cultural politics united under a single doctrine
and figurehead. Granted, this doctrine changed throughout the following decades, however, the
Communists Party’s political ideology persists as a dominant cultural narrative to the present
day.
This politico-cultural narrative trend continued and was intensified during the Cultural
Revolution from 1966-76. During this time Mao Zedong thought developed into a highly
widespread form of political rhetoric that greatly shaped political discourse radically antagonized
the traditional culture. ‘The Four Olds’ and ‘the Four News’ are the rhetorical basis for this
ideological radicalism. A publication of Mao Zedong thought, explains ‘the Four Olds,’ “Break
away from old ideology, old culture, old custom, and old habit”47. The CCP published Red Flag
also continued to denounce tradition through explicit critique of Confucianism with sayings such
as, “Confucius and Lin Biao were political swindlers.”48 According to Xing Lu, author of “An
Ideological/ Cultural Analysis of Political Slogans in Communist China,” such slogans were the
basis of establishing fanatic ideological fervor in society and transforming popular conceptions
of acceptable culture. The violence of the Red Guard demonstrates how Maoist ideology was
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actualized. During the early years of the Cultural Revolution the Red Guard, holding Mao
Zedong thought as holy doctrine, “rampaged throughout China, seeking and destroying anything
representative of the feudal past and the bourgeois present.”49 Thus political rhetoric during the
Cultural Revolution, much like Mao’s Yan’an Talks on Art and Literature two decades earlier,
initiated a change in social and cultural ideology.
With its severity and radicalism, the Cultural Revolution carries a number of implications
for the construction of Chinese modern national and cultural identity. Certainly, the Cultural
Revolution is inseparable from the early years in the People’s Republic of China before 1966
and the drastic social, economic, and cultural changes following 1976. Tang Shaojie, a
contributing scholar to the journal Culture and Social Transformation in Reform Era China,
asserts that the Cultural Revolution simultaneously presents contradictions as well as continuities
with the years leading up to, and following the Cultural Revolution.50 The Cultural Revolution
was an opportunity to stabilize Mao’s control over the party. Furthermore, Mao attempted to
solidify an exhaustive commitment to the communist party throughout society during the
Cultural Revolution. However, the years following the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao
Zedong in 1976 lead to a reversal of the radical social, political, and economic mission of the
CCP during the Cultural Revolution era. Post-1976 China began a new era of reform and
development, which will be discussed in greater detail below.
After the death of Mao Zedong, China opened yet another chapter in its political-cultural
redefinition. Mao’s revolutionary politics left the economy in shambles and created a virtual
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famine. Under Deng Xiaoping, president of the CCP after Mao, revolutionary politics took a
backseat to economic modernization. Ideologically the ‘Four News’ of the Mao era were
replaced with the ‘Four Modernizations,” referring to developing the areas of agriculture,
industry, national defense, and science and technology. China’s economic growth and embrace
of laissez faire capitalism, appears contradictory to the fervent socialist political orientation of
the preceding decades. However, Deng Xiaoping’s address at the Third Plenum in 1978 reflects
the nuance of this ideological shift. He said, “Carrying out the Four Modernizations requires
great growth in the productive forces and…changes in all methods of management, actions, and
thinking that stand in the way of such growth. Socialist modernization is therefore a profound
and extensive revolution.”51 Deng regards modernization as an extension of socialism and the
Chinese revolution. Therefore, while the message may appear contradictory to the Maoist
thought that ruled the nation for decades, Deng embraced the ideological power of the
Communist Party. Throughout its lifespan the Communist Party has been able to shape pervasive
social and political movements, although the ideology itself has changed.
The transformation of CCP policy from Mao to Deng demonstrates a dialectic between
populous social reality and the ideology of the CCP. In other words, one affects the other –
social and cultural reality, as well as CCP ideology and policy impact one another. For instance,
social reality necessitated the ‘Socialist modernization’ that Deng discusses in the excerpt above.
After the Cultural Revolution many farms and communes were left in desperate conditions and
were not able to produce large amounts of agriculture. Deng implemented the ‘responsibility
system,’ abolishing the commune system established under Mao, and giving farmers incentive
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through the ability to profit from production.52 In this case, the social realities of the Chinese
populous gave rise to sweeping reform that changed prior ideological orientations.
However, “ideological indoctrination…does not simply reflect but also shapes thought and
culture.”53 This means, while society impacts political policy, political thought in turn transforms
cultural and social reality. In the case of Deng reforms, social reality was the primary impetus for
the reforms. However, the economic and political liberalization of the reform era, in turn, lead to
a new era of re-defining Chinese culture in terms of modernity and tradition. The Confucian
revival in the PRC beginning in the 1980’s is a prime example of such social and cultural
transformation in an era of reform. This chapter will now discuss the transformation of
Confucianism during the mid-20th century in order to understand the historical context of the
Confucian revival in the 1980’s in the PRC.
In the wake of the fall of the Qing dynasty and the subsequent backlash against the ‘olds’
by the May Fourth Movement and Communist Party, Confucianism appeared to be a relic,
unable to modernize. In the early 1970s sinologist Vitali Rubin asserted that Confucianism was
significant to understand thousands of years of history and tradition, but was an opposing force
to the revolutionary culture of the twentieth century. Moreover Rubin argued that the
revolutionary side of China is not a recent development, but rather groups such as the Yellow
Turbans demonstrate a tradition of radicalism in Chinese history. However, these groups operate
in opposition to dominant Confucian society. Rubin believes that Confucianism was an
unrelenting hegemonic ideology. Rubin argues that Confucianism, achieved high standing, but
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also great stagnation, particularly through the Neo-Confucian era.54 Certainly, Confucianism, as
well as officials and literati, have played a central role in Chinese political, social, and
intellectual history. However, Rubin purports this side of intellectual history stifles progress and
culture, and is incompatible with the modern era. Rubin assumes that Confucianism and
modernity are opposing forces – as thesis and antithesis.
Rubin’s discussion of Confucianism as incompatible with modernity must be historicized
in order to understand his logic as a sinologist, and in order to illustrate the oversights in his
argument. By the late 20th century China was marked by more than a century of radical
transformation. As a result it is easy to understand why Confucianism, a prevalent dimension of
Chinese dynastic life and a highly criticized dimension of modernity, was dismissed as a piece of
Chinese past. Throughout the 20th century various Chinese and Western thinkers attacked
Confucianism. Also, as the cultural and political revolution continued under the Chinese
Community Party, Mao and his anti-Confucian ideology enjoyed a cult-like status. As Rubin
correctly indicates, during the Cultural Revolution Maoist literature was published and
consumed with fervor comparable to “the dissemination of the holy sutras.”55 This cult behavior
radically opposed the olds and addressed modernity and progress. Following the decades of
revolution under Mao, Confucianism was readily understood as antithetical to modernity as it
was the subject of critique for so long. Rubin focused on the developments of Maoist China,
certainly the most important political-cultural force in China in 1970, the year Rubin published
his article. Rubin does not consider the transformation of Confucianism. Responding to the
revolutionary movements and modernization Rubin assumes that Confucianism is incompatible
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with modernity. As we will see below, Confucianism and modernity are not diametrically
opposed. Rather the transformation of Confucianism reflects a dialectic between tradition and
modernity in Chinese culture.
The large number of Confucian thinkers in the twentieth century not only disproves the
myth that Confucianism died with the communist revolution, but also demonstrates that
Confucianism transformed in the 20th century with the development of modern China. In fact,
Yen Ching-Hwang, history professor at the National University of Singapore and publisher
of “The Confucian Revival Movement in Singapore and Malaya, 1899-1911,” argues the
Confucian Revival movement began as early as the end of the 19th century. Yen posits that
Kang Youwei and the Hundred Days Reforms established the revival movement in Mainland
China.56 Confucian Revivalism continued after the fall of the Qing dynasty as well. According to
Yen, 130 cities across China were home to “Confucian revivalist activities.” 57 Such activities
included magazine publications discussing the importance of Confucianism or the creation of
cult Confucian groups, and the endorsement of Confucianism in a draft of the Republic’s
constitution (Yen 34). Contrary to Rubin, Yen purports that Confucianism was not eradicated
with the actions of the iconoclasts, fall of the dynastic system, and search for a ‘new cultural
spirit’ as discussed during the May Fourth era. In fact turn, of the century Confucian
conservatism redefined Confucian identity and negotiated its standing in society.
Umberto Bresciani, discussed at length in the introductory chapter, delineates 20th
century Confucians into three generations to illustrate their development. During the 1920s until
the end of the 1940’s the Confucians of the first generation participated in the revolutionary
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political discourse of the era. The second generation began after the Communist Party assumed
control of Mainland China in 1949, many Confucians went into exile in Hong Kong, Singapore,
Taiwan and other East Asian countries. These thinkers still participated in the political rhetoric
of their day, largely condeming the actions of the PRC, but also established Confucian
academies to further Confucian learning. This generation is exemplified by Mou Zongsan. The
third has become more politicaly engaged in the PRC since the 1980’s. Characterized by the
works of Tu Weiming, this generation is the first group which self-identifyies as New Confucian,
distinct from Neo-Confucian.58 This description is brief as I discuss the progression of the 20th
century Confucians in greater detail in the introductory chapter. The Confucians of each
generation are distinguished by they political and social context of the three time periods.
Throughout the three generations, the position of the Confucian within Chinese society changed.
However, Confucians continued to participate in political and social discourse throughout these
three different time periods in the 20th century.
The work of Yen and Bresciani confirm that the Confucian Revival as a cultural
movement originated as in the imperial history during the mid 19th and 20th centuries.
Moreover, the several stages of the movement illustrate how the revival continually responded to
China’s modernization. Certainly, there are significant differences between Kang Youwei and
later Confucian thinkers of the 20th century. Kang was a Neo-Confucian who attempted to
preserve the Qing dynasty and authority of the Confucian literati, negotiating the role of
Confucianism in Chinese society through the Qing reforms. Later revivalist movements have not
held the same political clout. Rather, the later generations of New Confucians operate from the
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periphery of the dominant political discourse. Still, Yen and Bresciani’s work is important in
critiquing Rubin’s position. It indicates that modernity in China is not a function of unchecked
Western dominance, but a process in which traditional cultural identity was continuously
negotiated in society, as Chinese intellectuals experienced increasing pressure from the West.
Discussing Mou Zongsan and Tu Weiming, second and third generation Confucians Revivalists,
in greater detail below demonstrates the negotiation between modernity and tradition.
Born in 1909, Mou was a member of the new Chinese generation, born after the abolition
of the Confucian exam system.59 As aforementioned, this reform was an intellectual watershed in
China at the turn of century. Many thinkers such as Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi attempted to define
China’s cultural modernity. As the birth of the Communist Party and the years of Cultural
Revolution indicate, the radicalization of culture to overthrow the ‘backwards’ traditions is a
salient feature of Chinese modernity. However, Mou’s place in Chinese history indicates another
side to the radical transformation of culture and tradition in the twentieth century. However, Mou
was incredibly critical of the Sino-Western philosophical and political discourse from the 19th
and early 20th century. According to Tang Refeng, “Mou judged that philosophers who
reinterpret Chinese philosophy in terms of a particular Western school have no real
understanding of Chinese philosophy at all.”60 With this critical perspective, Mou not only
criticized former discourse, but also devoted his life and work to the development of
Confucianism in modernity.
Along with Carson Zhang, Dang Zhunyi, and Xu Foguan, Mou Zongsan published “A
Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinolgy and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture” in 1958. While
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this manifesto was published almost two decades prior to Rubin and Bauer, it criticized many of
the perspectives in Sinology to which they adhered. Mou and his colleagues proposed that
Sinology has had three incompetent modes of thinking. First, Jesuit missionaries established
contact with China centuries ago, but utterly misunderstood the role of religion in China in order
to embolden the chance of religious compatibility and conversion. Second, Sinologists began to
study Chinese history and cultural life, but in a way “analogous to that in the relics of ancient
Egypt and Asia Minor.”61 This is one of the issues that Rubin and Bauer face in their critique of
Confucianism; they appear to discuss Confucian for its role in China before the twentieth
century. The, during the time of the manifesto’s publication many governments were taking new
interest in China. However, this interest in China appeared exclude a genuine appreciation for
Chinese history and culture (457-9). With this criticism of Sinology, Mou and his colleagues
offer a new approach in order to understand culture as alive and dynamic in China.
The Manifesto reappraises Chinese culture and does so through Confucian discourse.
Mou offers two essential statements about Chinese culture. Namely culture is alive in China, and
that “culture is the objective expression of the spiritual life of mankind.”62 In true Confucian
form, culture has a direct connection to spirituality. For Mou and the other New Confucian
thinkers of the manifesto, human ‘Heart and Nature’ (xinxing 心性) is the basis of China’s
cultural spirit. The manifesto defines Heart and Nature as the “concentration of mind on an
exhaustive study of the nature of the universe.”63 With Heart and Nature, Chinese thought does
not deal with morality or social order alone. Rather, philosophy is substantiated through
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contemplation of the universe. It is no wonder that Tang Refeng notes, “according to Mou, the
quintessence of Chinese philosophy is in its metaphysics.”64 Moral metaphysics is also not
unique to the New Confucians. In fact the metaphysical support for morality and philosophical
thought may be traced to classical Confucian texts such as Doctrine of the Mean. However, the
manifesto asserts the importance of this metaphysical contemplation as, “[Heart and Nature] is
the root of Chinese thought.”65 Moreover, it is through contemplation of Heart and Nature that
people create an active dialogue with heaven and the rest of humanity. Following xin-xin, the
Neo-Confucians of the Song-Ming era, “equate…the human heart with the cosmic heart.” 66 The
manifesto argues that Chinese thought and culture from Confucius and Mencius until the present
day is grounded in a communion with the rest of humanity and Heaven. Although Mou and his
generation of Confucian thinkers did not identify as ‘New Confucians,’ Mou’s work responds to
and participates the discourse concerning Chinese modernity. Mou’s philosophical claims in the
Manifesto reflect that Confucianism was not dominated by modernization and revolution.
Rather, Confucians of the 20th century provided a critique of modernization and staked a claim
in defining modern Chinese cultural identity and continue the practice and teaching of
Confucianism.
Mou’s discussion of Confucian culture also takes on global significance. In the abovementioned quote regarding culture as the expression of humanity’s spirituality, the manifesto
asserts that culture in general assumes metaphysical importance. In addressing culture at large,
Mou and his colleagues are able to turn the discussion about China into a universalist discourse.
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While Confucianism is not universal, Mou and colleagues believe that modernization carries
drastic consequences for culture in every state. As such, the manifesto not only discusses
Chinese culture, but issues of world culture. For instance, Mou and his colleagues assert that the
West is in need of many cultural and spiritual changes in order to strengthen in modernity. They
argue, “the strength of the West’s cultural spirit lies in its ability to push ahead indefinitely.
However, there is not secure foundation underlying this feverish pursuit of progress.”67
Following the logic of the manifesto, if the West develops without stable cultural foundations
then this is a crisis of Western spirituality. Therefore, for the New Confucian thinkers of the
manifesto, the West is also subject to the crises of modernization and globalization. Thus, Mou
globalizes his discussion of Confucian culture. He claims that Confucian culture, like spirituality
in the West, is in the midst of a crisis of modernity.
Like Mou Zongsan, Tu Weiming reflects Confucian principles to issues of globalization
and modernization in a worldwide context. Both Mou and Tu argue that Confucianism can
address global issues. In “Multiple Modernities” Tu describes the current state of the global
community as “creative confusion” where the entire world is grappling with several
dichotomies: “the traditional/modern, the West/rest and the local/global.” 68 Certainly the
imperialist, colonialist history is apparent in the Chinese memory. However, Tu is committed to
the fact that these dichotomies affect each of the parties involved. In other words, within
the ‘West/rest’ dichotomy, both the West and the rest of the globe contend with imperialist
histories and co-create the present moment. Tu uses North America as an example of such global
concerns,
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“The recent North American upsurge of interest in community may have been stimulated
by a sense of crisis that social disintegration is a serious threat to the well-being of the
Republic, but the local conditions in the United States and Canada, precipitated by the
ethnic and linguistic conflicts, are generalizable throughout the highly industrialized, if
not post-modern, First World.”69
This demonstrates that on the local and global level, societies are grappling with universal
problems of culture, tradition and modernity. Furthermore, although the West is conventionally
imagined as modern, modernity creates seemingly irreconcilable hardships for the West as well.
With such concerns for modernity, Tu makes the case that the Confucian revival has
arisen to answer the questions of the local-global and modern-tradition dichotomies. Tu
says, “The rise of Confucian East Asia suggests that traditions are present as active agents in
modernity and, by implication, the modernizing process can assume different cultural forms.” 70
Tu remarks that imperialist history often frames ‘Western’ as ‘global.’ Tu argues that
Confucianism, a tradition local to East Asia, is in fact compatible with global, modern realities.
Tu transcends the tradition-modernity dichotomy as he illustrates that political Confucianism “as
a response to the Western impact…[has] been thoroughly reconfigured in a new constellation.” 71
Under this ‘new constellation’ Tu argues that Confucianism not only supports democratization
and open economic development, but actually demands it as well as other requirements for a
stable modern society.
In “Multiple Modernities” Tu enumerates the dimensions of a new political
Confucianism that addresses modern needs. First, New Confucianism demands an active role of
the government in economic development as, “The government is perceived, in principle, as a
positive force for social stability.”72 This clearly corresponds to the nature of government under
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Neo and Classical Confucianism, only reacting to the advent of market economy and its impact
on the stability of the modern state. Second, New Confucianism also grapples with the modern
concept of Law. Whereas Confucianism has been critiqued for its incompatibility with Law, Tu
asserts that social peace is central to a Confucian society. These two notions show a reaction to
the Enlightenment dominated discourse around political modernity that has shaped many modern
states. While Chinese thinkers have and continue to study Enlightenment thought, New
Confucianism demonstrates that it is not the only source for political thought or discourse in the
global setting. Tu also highlights the importance of the family in modern East Asia. The family
is responsible for transmitting the values that support and stabilize society. And as a result, the
family and the state share a very sensitive relationship.73 Whereas autonomy and individualism
are emphasized in ‘modern’ or ‘western’ discourse, Confucianism supports a notion of the
collective centered on the family and its benefits for national stability.
Lastly, Tu stresses two central principles to Confucianism, education and cultivation.
Each of these concepts are pivotal to the peace of the person, family, and state, but also help
resolve issues of modern politics.74 Specifically, education is believed to equip students with the
tools necessary to become upright citizens. While this is a conventionally WesternEnlightenment perspective, education under the New Confucian paradigm “must be congenial to
the development of cultural competence and appreciation of spiritual values.” 75 Similarly, selfcultivation is oriented towards maintaining stability in society and creating virtue-oriented
political leaders.
The above listed methods of applying Confucian ideology to modern political, critiques
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the modern Western concept of progress. Tu writes,
The time is long overdue to move beyond a mindset shaped by modernization as a
unilinear progression. As politics of domination fades, we welcome the drawing of an age
of communication, networking, negotiation, interaction, interfacing, and collaboration. 76
Tu uses the New Confucian discourse to change the way Western scholars and political
leaders conventionally think of modernity. Tu believes that modernity cannot be thought of
as a ‘unilinear progression.’ In other words, modernization is not Westernization. Rather, Tu
claims that modernity must be defined on Chinese Confucian cultural traditions. On the one
hand, Tu asserts the inevitability of democracy, popular elections, and economic liberalization
in Confucian culture, a statement that obviously supports a universalistic approach to modernity.
However, Tu also supports a diachronic model of the Confucian tradition. In this way, political
structures appear secondary to the centrality of Confucianism and culture in East Asian societies.
As democracy in East Asia is very new, and in China has yet to be completely realized, the
Confucian model for a new political era is still incredibly young and developing. What is perhaps
most significant about this application of New Confucianism to local and global problems is the
discursive power of Confucianism. While some may argue that these debates are still framed by
Western political and economic hegemony, Tu offers his own perspective on politics, economics,
and citizenship. In its modern history, Confucianism has therefore changed in reaction to
political development, such as Civil War and social upheaval, as well as the Open Door policy,
Four Modernizations and economic liberalization. However, New Confucianism has in turn
shaped political debate in those two spheres as well. This is best indicated by the prevalence of
New Confucian in Mainland Chinese political discourse in the post-Mao period.
As two leaders in the Confucian Revival, Mou and Tu present the two main tenets of the
revival movement – the creative transformation of the Confucian tradition, and engaging in a
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dialogue between Confucianism and modernization and globalization. In the above discussion
Mou and Tu present the work of Confucian revival to continue Confucian learning. Not only do
contemporary Confucians continue to propagate Confucianism, but they also reappraise
Confucian texts and practices to address present day issues. This is best illustrated by Tu’s
discussion of global issues presented in “Multiple Modernities.” In spite of the revolutionary
pressures of modernization that have defined China in the 20th century, the Confucian revival
continues to creatively redefine the Confucian tradition. More importantly, Tu and Mou illustrate
that the Confucian Revival has not only occurred in spite of, but also in response to
modernization and globalization. They recognize crises provoked by globalization and
modernization. They simultaneously redefine Confucianism for the 20th century and rethink
globalization through critique.
In the 1980’s New Confucianism entered political discourse in Mainland China. As
stated above, China found itself redefining culture as it left the political and social chaos of the
Cultural Revolution. Song Xianlin, a contributing scholar to the book New Confucianism: A
Critical Examination, argues, “While many agreed that the ‘revolutionary legacy’ of Mao’s era
did not represent the Chinese cultural tradition, confusion and strained arguments permeated the
debates that initiated ‘the cultural craze’.77” With this context the culture craze of the post-Mao
era inspired news publications, scholars, and philosophers to reevaluate Confucianism. This era
of redefining culture was not without debate. On the one hand, scholars such as Zhang Dainian
asserted, “now was the age for studying Confucianism with scientific Marxist philosophy.”78 On
the other hand, Bao Zunxin argued, “the cultural disasters of recent history were the direct
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legacy of what Mao and his colleagues had inherited from Confucianism.”79 Criticizing Maoism,
let alone comparing Mao to Confucius was all together unimaginable in the Cultural Revolution.
Furthermore, arguing for the compatibility between Marxism and Confucianism was similarly
absurd in the decades prior. Even though Bao is critical of the role of Confucius in China’s
modernity, this represents the massive sea-change of the 1980’s in China.
Within a decade after the death of Mao Zedong, the People Republic of China recognized
the centrality of Confucius to Chinese national identity. The Culture Craze of the 1980’s
radically reevaluated and redefined the national spirit, as Deng Xiaoping made the case
for ‘Socialist Spiritual Civilization’ and concerns for ‘Spiritual Pollution.’80 As Mou Zongsan
argued for the importance of culture to national spirit, the PRC officially regarded Confucius
as, “the founder of Chinese traditional culture.”81 Not only did the PRC begin to celebrate
Confucius birthday, but it also invited Tu Weiming to Beijing. While New Confucians
recognized the new epoch of Confucianism for decades, in the 1980’s the Communist Party
resuscitate Confucius for its nationalist agenda.
The relationship between third generation new Confucians and the politics of the CCP is
problematic for scholar Thierry Pairault, professor at the French National Scientific Research
Centre. Pairault authored “China’s Response to Globalization: Manufacturing Confucian
Values,” in Globalization and Transformation of Local Socio-economic Practices in 2008. As
the title of his article suggests, Pairault claims the Confucian Revival is a disingenuous form of
cultural preservation. According to Pairault, since the 1990’s the CCP has used the Confucian
Revival to “Sinicize Socialism.” In other words, Pairault believes that CCP endorses the revival
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to ideologically validate the policy of the CCP. For instance, Pairault presents that the Ministry
of Education in the CCP claims, “History reels off records proving that the roots of Marxist
ideology are already in the genes of Chinese traditional culture.”82 Certainly, the use of
Confucian ideals in political rhetoric creates the sense of the revival as utilitarian, or towing the
Communist Party line. However, this is only one aspect to the place of the Confucian Revival in
contemporary Mainland society. As the discussions of Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang in the
following chapter will demonstrate, the role of third generation Confucians is more complicated
than the political instrumentalism of the CCP.
In the present day, China stands in a continuing process of redefining culture in terms of
modernity and tradition. Clearly, the role of culture in the last two centuries has played a crucial
role to the political structure in China. Moreover, Confucian culture is negotiated through both
internal dialogues within China, as well as external dialogue with global forces. The creative
evolution of the Confucian tradition during the 19th and 20th centuries demonstrates these
internal and external dialogues. The work of New Confucians to redefine the Confucian tradition
is an example of an internal dialogue. The New Confucians continuously debated Confucian
culture throughout China’s modern history. This transformation was not only between
Confucians, but was also an external dialogue. Under the constant pressure of Westernization,
New Confucians adapted to, participated in, and critiqued modernization. New Confucians
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries redefined the relationship between Chinese cultural
tradition and modern Western notions of profess. As China is one the most dominant economic
super powers on the globe, the nation’s history indicates rampant modernization and
globalization. However, contemporary Chinese cultural identity is not a product of unilateral
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Westernization. Rather, culture in China must be understood as a dialectic of tradition and
modernity, in which the two elements are in dialogue with one another. This is why the
Confucian Revival is such an important movement in the modern Chinese history. It reflects that
cultural identity is one of transformation and a negotiation between the forces of tradition and
modernity.
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Chapter Three
Towards a Typology of New Confucianism:
Jiang Qing, Kang Xiaoguang, and the Politics of Mainland New Confucianism
Introduction
While the term New Confucianism refers to a specific movement in Mainland China and
abroad, there is great diversity in political ideology across the movement. This chapter
characterizes the political ideologies of the New Confucian movement. In a broad sense the
political ideology and affiliation of New Confucian activists can be conceived as either statist or
non-statist. Statist refers to Confucians who support the political ideology of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), or those who are endorsed or sponsored by the CCP. Non-statist refers
to New Confucians who do not support the political ideology of the CCP, and idealize a China
where Marxism is replaced with Confucian ideology and political organization. In either case,
the New Confucians illustrate the movement in Mainland China to fashion a contemporary
political ideology out of traditional culture and cultural nationalism.
The first section of this paper will address the prominence of state and non-state
Confucian intellectuals historically and in the present day. However, the politics of the New
Confucian movement are more complex than the political dichotomy described above would
suggest. Moving toward a more nuanced typology, this chapter then discusses the
characterizations of New Confucianism proposed by scholars Jiawen Ai and Sebastian Billioud.
Jiawen Ai is a doctoral student in politics at the University of Melbourne, Australia and
Sebastian Billioud is professor of Chinese Civilization at the University of Paris-Diderot, who
has published numerous articles regarding New Confucianism in Mainland China in China
Perspective, a quarterly journal that examines Chinese politics, economics, culture and society.
Each scholar’s typology of the movement offers differing, but significant modes of analysis.
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This chapter will then use Ai and Billioud’s typologies to characterize the works of two of the
most important New Confucians on Mainland China today – Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang.
Statist and Non-Statist Intellectuals of the Confucian Revival
The intellectuals in the Confucian revival play statist and non-statist roles in
contemporary China. In regards to the statist Confucian activities, the CCP began shifting their
focus to Confucian political ideology in the 1980’s. Mao Zedong thought and MarxismLeninism were the authoritative ideological voice in China for the preceding decades. With the
death of Mao and the beginning of a new era of reform, the ideological landscape in China began
a period of re-definition. At the same time, the Confucian Revival in Mainland and abroad
gained more momentum. For instance, the China Confucius Foundation was established in 1984
with headquarters in Beijing, the capital of the PRC. Furthermore the CCP endorsed the
celebration of Confucius’ birthday starting in 1987. 83 Fang Keli, Dean of Graduate Studies at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and member of the Office of Academic Degrees
Committee of the State Council, exemplifies well CCP political investment in Confucianism in
the post-Mao era. Fang lead two CCP-funded Confucian research projects from 1986 to 1990
and from 1990 to 1995, resulting in the publication of over 400 papers and numerous other
works.84 Moreover, in 1986 the State Education Commission sponsored research into
Confucianism, lead by Fang. At the Commission, Fang spoke on the compatibility of
Confucianism and modernity.85
Fang, and statist Confucian activities as a whole since the 1980’s, must be understood in
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the context of the political landscape of the CCP in the Post-Mao era. Jiawen Ai describes this as
a liminal period in Chinese ideology, arguing China has experienced a political ideological
vacuum in the last several decades. She writes, “it is evident that the CCP’s leadership has been
seeking a certain political ideology to supplement the void left by Marxism-Leninism.” 86 Ai
supports this claim by citing the CCP’s opening and reformation of the Chinese economy under
Deng Xiaoping, as well as President Hu Jintao’s speeches regarding innovating the CCP’s
methods and socialist culture. In this context, the efforts of Fang demonstrate the statist
Confucian mission. The Party supports Fang’s Confucian interest. This demonstrates Hu’s
sentiment of innovating the socialist culture. As the CCP has entered a new ideological paradigm
in the post-Mao era, the Party has created the intellectual space to explore Confucianism.
There are also examples of non-statist Confucian activism in the post-Mao era. For
instance, in 1989 Jiang Qing published an article in Taiwan arguing for the replacing Marxism
with Confucianism in Mainland China. This publication is significant in terms of the time period
in which it was published. Jiang Qing published his article only three years after Fang Keli
initiated state sponsored scholarship on Confucianism. Clearly, this indicates Qing disagreed and
responded to the direction of the state-sponsored Confucian activities and the principles of Fang
Keli. Another important factor is the place of publication – Taiwan. Although Jiang Qing is a
citizen of the PRC, he was either unable or chose to publish in Taiwan. Either possibility
indicates the political sensitivity of his publication and his opposition to the CCP. Jiang Qing’s
work “openly challenged the legitimacy of a communist party.” 87 These factors reflect the nonstatist nature of Jiang Qing.
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The difference between Qing and Fang demonstrate that the CCP endorsed Confucianism
is not representative of the entire New Confucians movement. The CCP was selective about the
scholars and content it sponsored or published. This indicates that while there is political
affiliation between the CCP and some Confucian activities, there is also tension between
Confucians and the CCP. However, this also indicates tension within Confucian scholarship, as
Jiang and Fang reflect differing political views in their work. Jiang Qing and other Confucians
disagree with state-sponsored CCP Confucians whose “researches are aimed at meeting the
party’s needs and legitimizing the party’s power.” 88 In examining the Confucian revival as an
entire movement there are two extremes of political affiliation; there are statist intellectuals, such
as Fang, and non-statist intellectuals, such as Jiang, that are both dedicated to the Confucian
project. This demonstrates that there is dynamism within the Confucian revival; the revival
movement involve the confluence of statist and non-statist intellectuals. While this statist and
non-statist Confucians are aparent, a more nuanced typology is necessary to understand the
complexity of the political motivations of any particular New Confucian intellectual. In other
words intellectuals of the Confucian revival hold motivations that are more intricate than
dichotomous categories of statist and non-statist. To that end the following section discusses two
prominent models proposed by Jiawen Ai and Sebastien Billioud.
Beyond the Statist and Non-statist Dichotomy
The typologies proposed by Jiawen Ai and Sebastien Billioud provide a more nuanced
framework for analyzing the intellectuals of the Confucian revival. Ai’s model categorizes new
Confucians in terms of three ideological groups – Confucians, liberal Confucianists, and socialist
Confucianists. As explained below, these categorize expand on the statist and non-statist
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dichotomy by analyzing New Confucians according to their political ideologies and affiliations
with the CCP. Billioud, on the other hand, examines the motivating factors behind New
Confucian activism. His three motivations are adherence to the Confucian worldview, as well as
political and economic gain. Whereas Ai characterizes Confucians in terms of rigid political
affiliation, Billioud’s model provides a more fluid framework for analyzing the interest of
Confucian intellectuals. This section discusses the typologies of Ai and Billioud and argues that
the application of both frameworks allows for a more nuanced characterization of Confucian
intellectuals.
In “Refunctioning of Confucianism: The Mainland Chinese Intellectual Response to
Confucianism since the 1980’s” Jiawen Ai describes the three categories of her model for
analyzing Confucian intellectuals. Ai’s categories are useful for understanding the diverse
ideology across the New Confucians, but also contain a judgment on the extent of sincerity in
Confucian belief. Ai writes, “Confucians… are adherents of Confucianism and look to it as an
alternative way of being, and ‘Confucianists’…specialize in studying Confucianism but are not
true believers.” 89 The notion of being a “true believer” is subjective and problematic. Ai’s article
does not mention self-determination on the part of those labeled Confucianists. In other words, it
is difficult to know whether or not someone labeled Confucianist by Ai does not consider him or
herself an ardent Confucian. However, these terms are useful in that they indicate political
affiliation. As such they illustrate the diversity of political ideology that informs the revival.
“Confucians” are those who believe that Confucianism is the only ideology that can unite
China, and should therefore be the basis of China’s political system and ideology. Confucians
believe that Westernization has lead to the degradation of China’s moral condition, causing
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social and political chaos. They reject both Marxism and liberal democracy as viable options for
political ideology. As these two ideologies are Western, they are incapable of capturing the
national identity. For example, Jiawen Ai writes, “while class struggle turns sons against fathers,
wives against husbands, and sibling against sibling, harmonious cooperation among all the
individuals and units of community contributes to the welfare of the national community and
moral values are capable of uniting the nation.” 90 Confucianism provides the national spirit that
will remedy the chaos brought on by Westernization. According to Jiawen Ai, the “ideal regime
seems to be the antithesis of both Western liberal democracy and Marxism” for Confucians. 91
The details of the political and ideological arguments of Confucians will be discussed later in
this chapter. However, it is important to note that Confucians, such as Jiang Qing and Kang
Xiaoguang, propose, “Confucianizing the CCP”. 92 In other words, this group of Confucians is
rethinking the government on a structural level, bringing Confucian religion and culture into the
fore. Through Confucianizing the CCP, Confucian elite and doctrine become the source of
political ideological legitimacy. Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang both propose Confucianism
should be endorsed as the state religion (although Confucians such as Jiang Qing and Kang
Xiaoguang support freedom of religion too). Furthermore, the government itself would be
restructured in a way that a group of Confucian elite would organize and run part of the
government.93 The details of this reformist vision will be provided later in this chapter. Here it is
important to note that Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang’s political models assume Confucianism
should be the political, spiritual, and cultural foundation of the government.
The “Socialist Confucianists” are the next category of New Confucians described by
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Jiawen Ai. “Socialists Confucianists” believe that studying Confucianism functions to serve the
political authority of the CCP. This group of Confucians, typified by Fang Keli believes that
Confucianism is vital to the future of China. However, Marxism is the fundamental political
ideology.94 Whereas “Confucians” believe in Confucianizing the CCP, the “socialist
Confucianists” believe in adapting Confucianism to Marxism. While many socialist
Confucianists argue that Confucianism can provide the legitimacy for Marxism, Ai argues these
Confucianists believe in tailoring Confucianism to fit Marxist ideology. Ai claims,
although “Confucianists portrayed themselves as true believers in Confucainism…when
Confucians argued in favor of ‘Confucian authoritarian regime… the socialist Confucians
showed their true identities as socialists, not Confucians.” 95 Given the iconoclasm of the Maoist
era, Confucianism legitimizing Communist authority appears contradictory. Scholars such as Ai
question the ultimate motivations and allegiances of this group. In any case, “socialist
Confucianists” enjoy a closer affiliation to the CCP and envision a different political reality for
the future of the People’s Republic of China. The most obvious difference is that the “socialist
Confucianists” argue for cultural nationalism to strengthen spirit and legitimacy of the political
system, preserving the authority of the CCP. As such, it is considered statist as opposed to the
non-statist perspective of the Confucians.
Finally, “liberal Confucianists” constitute the third category in Ai’s model. The primary
political object of this group is “political transparency within China” moving toward a
democratic system.96 This group of Confucianists is part of a broader movement for political
liberalization in the PRC. However proponents of liberalization, whether Confucian or not, do

94

ibid, pp. 38
Jiawen, Ai. "The Refunctioning of Confucianism: The Mainland Chinese Intellectual Response to Confucianism
since the 1980s." Issues & Studies 44.2 (2008): pp. 40
96 ibid, pp. 41
95

58

not support a model of democracy identical to Western democracy.97 This notion challenges the
idea of cultural universalism, arguing that different cultures provide different interpretations of
democracy. Ai cites Yijie, a professor at Beijing University, “it is impossible to categorize
human ideologies as either Western democracy or Confucian authoritarianism; what is needed is
a combination of both.”98 This reflects the nature of liberal Confucianists to be critical of
democracy and the Confucian tradition. While Confucianism is vital to modernization and
political reform, it requires the transformation of the tradition. This starkly contrasts with the
Confucians who ardently support the adherence to the texts and practices of the tradition.
However, it is similar to the Confucians in that they both call for replacing Marxist ideology.
While Ai’s typology is useful for showing the ideological differences across the New
Confucian movement, it also reveals their most important similarity. Ai writes, “socialist
Confucianists, liberal Confucianists, and Confucians all give favorable consideration to the
feasibility of applying Confucianism to the modernization of China.”99 Each of the three groups
is concerned with negotiation between tradition and modernity. All types of Confucians argue
modernizing the PRC via the Confucian tradition. Certainly only the socialist Confucianists can
be considered statist; the rest oppose Marxist ideology for different reasons. However, each
group of New Confucians challenges the CCP to define its modernizing project in relation to the
Confucian tradition in one form or another.
Sebastien Billioud offers another typology of the New Confucian movement. Similar to
Ai, Billioud believes the contemporary Confucianism movement in China contains a multiplicity
of ideals and motivations. Billioud writes, “The frequently encountered expression of ‘Confucian
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revival’ is indeed very problematic: not only does it point today to very different social
phenomena, but it also artificially gives the impression of a community of worldviews among
Confucian activists and sympathizers.”
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In “Carrying the Confucian Torch to the Masses”

Billioud establishes three motivations behind Confucian activism; they are adherence, politics,
and economics. 101 Diversity is the best way to characterize the Confucian movement in China
today. However, Billioud’s typology reflects a more dynamic relationship among the cultural,
philosophical, religious, and political ideals than Ai’s rigid categorization of political ideology.
The reason for such a difference is that Billioud discusses motivations rather than political
categories. Motivations are more subjective in nature, and as a result Confucian activists with
different political ideologies may share the same motiviations.
Confucians motivated by conformity to the cultural, religious, and philosophical elements
of the Confucian tradition represent the category of adhesion. Billioud describes this first
motiviation as, “adhesion to some elements of the ‘Confucian worldview,’ whatever these
elements may be.”102 This category is significant for it contrasts with Ai’s methodology in
several ways. Billioud’s language is intentionally vague. Phrases such as “some elements” reflect
that this type of Confucian is not necessarily devoutly religious. As Confucianism was the nexus
between Chinese social, political, religious, and cultural life for millennia, the tradition resounds
today in everyday life. In this sense, adherence to the Confucian worldview may manifest in
children displaying filial piety or devout religious academies where Confucian texts are studied
closely. This vagueness is further reflected in the use of quotation marks around “Confucian
worldview.” Without qualifying what this view is, it suggests multiple definitions of what
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constitutes the Confucian worldview. In this sense, Ai’s concepts of Confucians, socialist
Confucianists, and liberal Confucianists fit Billioud’s model of adherents; Ai’s three categories
all adhere to a Confucian worldview, although they disagree with each other on the specifics of
their ideals. While Billioud does not provide a rigid framework for analyzing the movement, he
succeeds in illustrating the complexity, interconnectedness, and plurality of Confucian activists.
The complexity of the Confucian movement is shown by the other two motivations
identified by Billioud: the economic and political. Both motivations are instrumental in nature;
economic refers to the material gains associated with Confucianism, and political refers to use of
Confucianism to support a political ideal. Examples of economic or material incentive
motivating Confucian activities include the companies publishing the Confucian classics for
profit or the rise of the tourist industry where traditional culture may be the main attraction. 103
Political motivations are similar to the socialist Confucianists described by Jiawen Ai; both are
endorsements of Confucianism that involve political gains with the CCP.104 Ai’s liberal
Confucianists do have political motivations as well, but Billioud’s notion of political motivation
is that support of Confucianism will manifest in gains within the CCP. While these two
categories are classified as material or political gain, “it is very difficult to speak simply in terms
of instrumentalisation, since a set of intertwined motivations needs to be taken into account
when analyzing such phenomena.”105 In other words, individuals and groups may benefit
politically or economically from endorsing or studying Confucianism, but many such individuals
believe they are adhering to a Confucian worldview as well.
The difference between statist and non-statist Confucians is still a relevant framework of
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the revival as a whole. However the statist / non-statist model does not provide the analytical
depth of the models of Ai and Billioud. Combining the frameworks of Ai and Billioud offers the
necessary nuances to analyzing the New Confucians. While Billioud argues for the fluidity of
motivations, Ai provides a rigid categorization. These two models are not mutually exclusive,
but rather complement each other. Given the lack of unity, political affiliation, and motivation
across the movement it is vital to understand these New Confucians in both fluid and rigid terms.
For instance, Fang is a socialist Confucianist according to Ai’s typology, as his efforts serve, and
are supported by, the CCP. However, Fang may not be interested in Confucianism because it is
politically advantageous. Fang’s close political affiliation does not require political motivations.
Rather he may be motivated by belief in a Confucian worldview. With the understanding of the
statist and non-statist models, as well as the frameworks provided by Ai and Billioud, the
following section will categorize two prominent New Confucians in the PRC, Jiang Qing and
Kang Xiaoguang.
Jiang Qing
Jiang Qing’s publications and teachings make him one of the most unique and influential
New Confucians in Mainland China today. Jiang’s work is groundbreaking in proposing and
conceptualizing a current day political-Confucian reality.106 As mentioned above, Jiang Qing has
been a prominent voice of Confucianism since the 1980’s. Jiang Qing not only endorses
Confucianism as a means of political organization, but has also established a traditional
Confucian academy in Guizhou province. As Daniel Bell describes in The Renaissance of
Confucianism in Contemporary China, “Jiang has written the most systematic and detailed
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defense of political Confucianism since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.” 107
Jiang espouses a political schema for realizing a Confucian-lead PRC, educates disciples on the
classics in an exclusive traditional academy, and has been a driving force in a movement to
educate Chinese youth on the Confucian classics. Most importantly, Jiang’s model for political
Confucianism is a contemporary expression of the Gongyang tradition and the teachings of Dong
Zhongshu, a Han dynasty Confucian intellectual. Jiang’s vision of political Confucianism not
only critiques the CCP as illegimate, but also distinguishes Jiang from other new Confucian
intellectual of the 20th and 21st century.
“From Mind [and Nature] Confucianism to Political Confucianism” illustrates Jiang’s
ideals regarding the direction and ideology of the New Confucian movement for the future of
China. As the title suggests, Jiang differentiates between Political Confucianism (zhengzhiruxue
政治儒学) and Mind-Nature Confucianism (xinxngruxue 心性儒学).108 Political Confucianism
emphasizes creating political and legal institutions based on Confucian values that would address
China’s current social and cultural crises. According to Jiang, Mind-Nature Confucianism is
primarily concerned with “the existential life of human individuals and their minds, rather than
the socio-political institutions.”109 This type of Confucianism esteems individualism; claiming
the individual is capable of transforming the immorality of the world through personal
cultivation.

‘Mind

Confucianism’

emphasizes

metaphysics,

internalization,

and

transcendentalism, which Jiang finds problematic as he holds that such principles involve
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influence from Western philosophy and distracts from social reality.110 The overemphasis on
Mind-Nature Confucianism undermines the ability of Confucianism to create harmony, as it
ignores the demand for political and social systems to govern China.
In Jiang’s view, the political system is necessary for the cultivation of the individual and
the realization of social harmony. He writes:
Every great civilization in the history of mankind consists of at least two components.
The first component is a conception of the origin of the universe that gives rise to human
life, and the rules and laws that sustain the order of the universe and human life. The
second component is the development of socio-political institutions that make it possible
to maintain an orderly human society.111
Jiang’s religious overtones are apparent here. As opposed to the cultural nationalism of the
statist Confucians, such as Fang Keli, Jiang asserts that a society first needs faith in a cosmogony
and a cosmology. Without such a metaphysical anchor, a society will not be ‘outstanding.’
Furthermore, the socio-political system stems directly from this metaphysical framework. It is
no surprise that Jiang mentions “rules and laws that sustain the order of the universe and human
life.” This sentiment speaks to the role of rites in the Confucian tradition, which are meant
to reflect and embody the greater cosmic patterns of the world, making them instrumental in
maintaining harmony. Thus, Jiang Qing argues, it is impossible to create socio-political order
without this metaphysical grounding.
Governance based on such a metaphyical foundation must reflect the Confucian ideal
of ‘Inner Sagliness and Outter Kingliness,’ neisheng waiwang 内圣外王.112 Tu Weiming, a
scholar of Confucianism and fellow New Confucian, argues this ancient Confucian

110

Jiang, Qing. "From Mind Confucianism to Political Confucianism." The Renaissance of Confucianism in
Contemporary China. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2011.pp. 19-20
111 ibid
112 ibid, pp. 18

64

ideal, “means... that only a sage is qualified to be a king.”113 The rule of a sage ensures that
political instituions reflect laws to maintian social harmony. Jiang asserts that the overemphasis
on Mind-Nature Confucianism does not allow this political social harmony to be realized. Mind
Confucianism emphasizes the individual cultivaiton of morality and virtue to the neglect of
social concerns. This emphasis on the individual excludes the important role of the sage-king
and implies that harmony can be achieved through individual cultivation alone. Jiang argues
Mind-Nature Confucianism is incapable of providing the political structure that is in accordance
with the Confucian metaphyical understanding, which would provide harmony in society.
Political Confucianism is about realizing Outer Kingliness to achieve the Kingly Way (wangdao
王道). Applying Jiawen Ai’s model, Jiang is a Confucian critical of both Marxism and liberal
democracy. Both political models are imported from the West, and therefore are not based on the
ethico-religious system necessary to maintain social harmony.
Jiang’s political Confucianism and emphasis on ‘Outer Kingliness’ is part of a tradition
of Confucian scholarship dating back to the original writings of Confucius. Political
Confucianism, Jiang argues, was established by the Gongyang tradition. The Gongyang
was, “derived from classical Confucian texts, especially The Book of Rites and The Spring and
Autumn Annals.”114 With that, Jiang claims that the Gongyang school was established on the
original writings of Confucius which were later elaborated by disciples Xunzi and ultimately
Dong Zhongshu.115 Thus, Jiang declares himself part of the Gongyang tradition. In doing so
Jiang declares that his scholarship is based on a long-established Confucian tradition with its
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own political history based on classical Confucian texts and a lineage of Confucian scholars
including Confucius, Xunzi, and Dong Zhongshu. Before discussing Jiang’s political structure it
is important to undersatnd the role of the Political Confucianism espoused by Dong Zhongshu in
the Han dynasty. Discussing Dong’s Political Confucianism will contextualize Jiang as a
contemporary revivisioning of the Gongyang tradition.
Dong Zhongshu (195-104 BCE) was a Han dynasty Confucian scholar and erudite of the
Gongyang commentary to The Spring and Autumn, a text attributed to Confucius. During the
rule of Emperor Wu, beginning in 140 BCE, Dong was instrumental in the establishment of an
Imperial University and the rise of Confucian civil bureaucracy. Dong’s belief in the function of
the King in governing a state is the foundation of Jiang Qing’s Political Confucianism. This is
demonstrated as Jiang argues,
Today’s Confucians must develop a Political Confucianism… derived from the classical
Confucian texts, especially… The Spring and Autumn… traced back to Confucius’
original writings…elaborated by… Dong Zhongshu.116
As Jiang declares his Political Confucianism part of the lineage of Dong Zhongshu, it is
important to understand the Dong’s political vision of Confucianism.
Dong’s Political Confucianism is established on the rule of a sage-King. Dong argued
that the purpose of the ruler was to “initiate and facilitate the process of aligning the order and
values of the human world with those of Heaven…”117 This demonstrates a metaphysical
dimension to the rule of a King. The King must be capable of uniting human kind with the Way
of Heaven, thus ensuring social and cosmic harmony. Because of this metaphysical role, Dong
argued that the King must be a sage. Sarah Queen, professor of History at Connecticut College
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and Han dynasty scholar, writes,
By first establishing unity in his own person, Tung Chung-shu argued, the ruler thereby
transformed others through his example… The sage-king had earned his position of
leadership precisely because he had surpassed the average person in his endeavor to
cultivate his Heavenly virtues.118
The unity of Heaven and the state requires the King to cultivate the qualities of a sage. The King
has the authority to rule if he has reached sage-hood and is personally united with the Way of
Heaven.
Dong Zhongshu’s ideal sage-King expresses the meaning of the ideal “Inner Sageliness
and Outer Kingliness” (neisheng waiwang 内圣外王). Kingliness is the cultivation of
Sageliness. Dong Zhongshu asserts that the ruler must be a sage. The sage understands the Way
of Heaven and Humanity and is capable of uniting the two. Although individual moral
cultivation and propriety of social relationships is important, Dong Zhongshu emphasizes the
importance of the King in maintaining cosmic order. This is significant for understanding the
work of Jiang Qing. Jiang believes in the importance of political order, involving the rites, based
on a metaphyical understanding, that preserves social harmony. Furthermore, he is critical of
Mind-Nature Confuicanism which emphasizes individual cultivation of Inner Sageliness at the
expense of Outer Kingliness. Jiang believes that the emphasis on the individual excludes an
enlightened government that Dong Zhongshu held as necessary. Thus, Jiang emphasizes the
Gongyang tradition and the writings of Dong Zhongshu as it provides a potlical-social
framework that is based on Confucian moral metaphysics.
The role of understanding the Way of Heaven and the Way of the human kind did not
provide the King with unchecked divine power. Rather the moral-metaphysical significance of
the King placed immense social, political, and religious responsibiltiy the emperor. The emperor
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was held accountable by the “mutual responsiveness of heaven and man.”119 This meant that
when the King was unsuccessful in governing the people, the cosmos and the state would be in
disarray. Certainly the King was responsible for uniting Heaven and human kind, but this also
meant that the King was ultimately obligated to answer to Heaven. Queen discusses Dong’s
notion of Confucian political dissent:
[Dong] helped establish a Heaven-centered mode of political criticism, providing
opportunities for officials to censure the emperor through their interpretation of omens. It
became a powerful political weapon during the Han and persisted as a traditional form of
political dialogue between the emperor and his officials.120
In this sense, Dong Zhongshu believed that Confucian intellectuals provided legitimacy and a
check on the king’s power.
Jiang’s political vision involves a government that would unite the Way of Heaven and
Humanity. Jiang’s governmental organization is based on three forms of political legitimacy –
being in accordance with the Dao, the national heritage of a people, and having the consent of
the common people that are governed.121Another way to conceptualize legitimacy in Confucian
terms would be that the government must have the consent of Heaven, earth and the people. 122
This notion of legitimacy lies in the historical tradition of the Han dynasty Gongyang school.
Quoting Dong Zhongshu, Jiang writes, “the Gongyang Scholars held that ‘the King is he who
penetrates the three of Heaven, Earth and Human’, and that ‘ the Kingly Way combines the
three into one…’”123 This reflects the importance Jiang places on Outer Kingliness; that having a
king that rules with legitimacy from Heaven, Earth, and the people has the ability to restore
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harmony. Jiang, like Dong Zhongshu, believes that if the governing body does not have the
legitimacy of Heaven, it is not suitable to rule. This places great importance to the government,
while also holding the government accountable.
While in ancient China this ideal of the ruler who unites Heaven, Earth, and Humanity
was personified as a sage-king, Jiang’s governmental structure uses a tri-cameral legislature to
address these three sources of legitimacy. The three houses are the House of Profound
Confucians, House of National Continuity, and of House of Plebeians, referring to Heaven,
Earth, and the people respectively.124 A complete description of the three houses is not available
in English, and Jiang’s book, Political Confucianism, is difficult to find in the US and China. For
this reason I will rely on the discussion of the three houses provided by Ruichang Wang and
Daniel Bell, both being authorities on bew Confucianism and Jiang Qing’s work in particular.
According to Ruichang Wang, editor of The Renaissance of Confucianism in
Contemporary China, “the particular way the members of each house of the legislature are
chosen and the mechanism of checks and balances among the three houses are quite complex
and are still being elaborated.”125 Wang explains that the House of Profound Confucians will be
elected by an independent, nongovernmental group of Confucian scholars. This house will be the
highest of the three in terms of political power, although the specifics are not detailed in Rui’s
description. It is important to note that the Confucian scholars will be elected by a nongovernmental organization of Confucians. Jiang believes that the Confucian are suitable to hold
the most political power because of their sage-like qualities. However, Jiang’s political model
maintains a body of Confucian scholars outside of the government. Although it is not exlpicitly
stated, this implies that these non-governmental Confucian scholars are a source of legitimacy

124
125

69

ibid, pp. 40-1
Ibid

and a check on the state power. They provide legitimacy in that they appoint and endorse the
government leaders. However, Confucians will also hold the government accountable by holding
to power to elect new leadership to the government. This is one example where Jiang’s political
structure applies the teaching of Dong Zhongshu. Like Dong, Jiang envision a government that is
given empowered and held accountable by Confucian scholars.
The other two houses of the government are the House of National Continuity and the
Plebian House. The House of National Continuity will consist of representatives from
Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, and Christianity, the major religions of the nation.
Additionally, the House of National Continuity will include descendants of important leaders in
those religions. Lastly, the Plebian House will be elected through elections. The House of
National Continuity would have less power than the Confucians, and the Plebian house has the
least power.126 Not only would this structure reshape the government of the PRC, but also it
would replace Marxism or economic development as the source of legitimacy or dominant
political concern. Moreover, this system is non-democratic. The will of the people is not second,
but third to the historical-cultural norms and Confucian doctrine. As mentioned above, the
details of the checks and balances are unclear. Also, the three houses are intended to function in
harmony, and it is unclear how all three houses will ensure agreement and decision-making.
While there is still much to be developed further in this system, Jiang presents a clear-cut
example of a Confucian who is against socialist and liberal Confucianists in Ai’s
characterization. Furthermore, the governmental structure and ideology of Jiang illustrates
Billioud adherent motivation.
Jiang’s argument for political Confucianism based on the Gongyang tradition criticizes
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several 20th century Confucians, such as Mou Zongsan, Carson Zhang, and Tang Junyi. The
works of Mou Zongsan, discussed in chapter two, is usually hailed as one of, if not the most,
important political treatises to reframe Chinese modernity and tradition. However, Jiang claims
that Mou’s view supports Mind-Nature Confucianism and was not capable of realizing the
political structure necessary for saving China. Jiang claims that Mou, as well as Tang Junyi and
Carson Zhang, “contend that the most fundamental concern of Confucianism should be to teach
individuals to cultivate virtue and to perfect their personality through self-effort and selfstudy.”127 Jiang appreciates the impact of Mou’s work on the 20th century movement, and the
preservation of the tradition. However, Jiang does not believe that Mou’s model is capable of
saving China. Mou and other supporters of Mind-Nature Confucianism do not provide the
political structure, based on metaphysical prinicples, that Jiang holds to be an important part of
the Confucian tradition and necessary for saving Chinese society.
Jiang’s work is one of the most involved models for political re-structuring offered in the
Confucian revival. His political vision is exhaustive; not only does it describe the bodies of
government, but also a new role of the government based on the Gongyang tradition. Jiang’s
view of political Confucianism is also distinctly opposed to the politics of the CCP. Jiang’s
political vision is one without a Chinese Communist Party all together. This establishes Jiang as
a staunch non-statist. Jiang examplifies the role of the Confucian intellectual in critiquing the
state. As Dong Zhongshu held the emperor’s leadership accountable to Heaven, Jiang demands a
political structure that will reflect metaphysical order and garuantee social harmony. With that,
Jiang is not satisfied with intellectuals, such as Mou Zongsan, who emphasize Mind-Nature
Confucianism. This demonstrates that Confucian intellectuals do not share the same cohesive
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political view. Within the Confucian revival, Jiang represents one of a multiplicity of political
and social visions. Jiang critiques and engages the CCP and other Confucian intellectuals in
envisioning the Chinese political and social reality out of a reassessment of the Confucian
tradition.
Kang Xiaoguang: Benevolent Government
Kang Xiaoguang is a New Confucian who provides a critique of the CCP and Chinese
society and provides a new government model based on religious political Confucianism. Kang
envisions a “Benevolent Government” which is a form of Confucian authoritarianism. The goal
of this government is to provide a legitimate and stable political structure for China that will
create national growth and harmony. Unlike Jiang Qing, Kang’s Political Confucianism is
established on the teachings of Mencius (371-289 BCE). Even though Jiang and Kang are both
non-CCP intelligentsia with similar motivations in reviving politico-religious Confucianism,
they support two different revisionings of Confucianism. Jiang is part of the Gongyang, while
Kang is part of the Mencian tradition. The differences between Kang and Jiang demonstrate the
pluralism and dynamism throughout the movement to re-imagine the Confucian tradition for
Chinese modernity.
In 2005 Kang published Benevolent Government: The Third Road to China’s Political
Development, in which he details a political critique and proposes new government mechanisms.
As the title suggests, the ancient Confucian virtue benevolence (ren 仁) is the central tenet of
political legitimacy for a government. The ideal of benevolent government (renzheng 仁政) is
crucial in the works of Mencius. Throughout Kang’s article “Confucianization: A Future in the
Tradtion” Kang argues that his beliefs on human nature and the necessity of a benevolent
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government are inspired by the teachings of Mencius. Kang cites Mencius, “that whereby man
differs from the lower animals is but small.”128 The small difference is that humans are capable
of empathy, which is the root of benevolence. Kang argues that a government is needed to bring
out the benevolent, empathetic side of humanity, which will stop humans from being lower
animals. As Kang states the importance of Mencius, I will briefly discuss the Mencian ideal of
benevolent government in order to contextualize Kang as a revisioning of the teachings of
Mencius.
Benevolent government is exlipicated in Book 4 Part A of the Mencius, the Confucian
classic attributed to Mencius. This book begins with asserting that benevolence is the foundation
of effective government. Mencius writes, “even if you knew the way of Yao and Shun, you
could not rule the Empire equitably except through benevolent government.”129 Mencius
elaborates in 4.A.2, “There are two ways and only two: benevolence and cruelty.”130 Mencius
claims that cruel governments lacking benevolence disregard their subjects. Not only are these
governments ineffective, but they will not recieve the Mandate of Heaven and are therefore
destined to fail.
Mencius claims that benevolent government is the only way to rectify the state, creating
social and cosmic harmony. This is because the virtue of the emperor effects the virture of the
governed. Mencius writes, “The great man alone can rectify the evils in the prince’s heart. When
the prince is benevolent, everyone else is benevolent.”131 Benevolent government is effective
because the ruler is in a place of moral influence over subjects. This means that the King must
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personally cultivate benevolence in order to rule. Mencius explains:
If a man in a subordinate position fails to win the confidence of his superiors, he cannot
hope to govern the people. There is a way for him to win the confidence of his superiors.
If his friends o not trust him, he will not win the confidence of his superiors. There is
way for him to win the trust of his friends. If in serving his parents he fails ot please them
he will no tiwn the trust of his friends. There is a way for him to please his parents. If
upon looking within he finds that he has not been true to himself, he will not please his
parents.132
This passage explains how one can cultivate the ability to govern. Self-reflection, and sincerity
are fundamental to being filial. Being filial is an expression of one’s personal recititude and
cultivation. Therefore, if one is filial then they will recieve the trust of friends and the confidence
of superiors. In this way, moral rectitude and cultivation is central to becoming a benvolent
leader. Most imporantly, the reflection involved in cultivating character not only requires selfreflection, but also reflection on the Way of Heaven. Mencius explains, “Hence being true is the
Way of Heaven; to reflect upon this is the Way of man.”133 Cultivation involves understanding
and uniting with Heaven. It is because of this connection with Heaven that one is able to govern
and rectify the state. Mencius writes, “There has never been a man totally true to himself who
fails to move others.”134 Bringing order to a chaotic state requires the cultivation of benevolence
through understand Heaven.
According to Kang, China is in a state of disorder that only benevolent rule can remedy.
Kang argues that China lacks benevolence at all levels of society from the government to the
rich, the intelligentsia, and the masses.135 As such Kang calls for a community of Confucian
scholars to head the government. In Kang’s political organization, Confucians would dictate in
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a “benevolent authoritarianism.”136 The notion authoritarianism is significant for Kang’s political
model. Obviously, authoritarianism is anti-democratic. However, Kang argues that democracy is
not able to achieve benevolence because it asserts that people are sovereign. Kang believes that
the masses are capable of empathy and benevolence, but human nature is such that people can be
good or bad. Given the quality of human nature, democracy is flawed because it does not provide
the proper governing mechanism for making people realize the goodness in human nature. Thus,
Kang believes sovereignty should lie with the Confucian scholars who understand the Way of
Heaven. Kang writes, “the Way of Heaven is higher than public opinion, and only the
community of Confucian scholars can understand the Way of Heaven.”137
Kang’s ‘benevolent authoritarianism’ reflects the principals of political Confucianism
explicated in Mencius. In the passage discussed above, Mencius explains that ability to govern is
dependent on personal cultivation based on unity with the Way of Heaven.138 The only person
suitable to be King is one who is cultivated. This relates to Kang’s notion of authoritarianism, as
the masses did not hold political authority in Mencius’ view. The cultivated, benevolent ruler is
alone capable of rectifying the society. As Kang claims that society is in disorder, a benevolent
governing authority is necessary for creating social harmony.
To realize a benevolent authoritarianism, Kang proposes a system of integration between
the Confucian orthodoxy, educational system, and political rule. The Confucian orthodoxy,
which is the political philosophy that established rules of political practice, is the foundation of
this system. The orthodoxy is passed down through the educational system. Such education can
be through public or private organizations that promote the practice of Confucianism. Confucian
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education would be required of the political system. Government officials and elite would be
educated in Confucianism, learning the orthodoxy and then being assessed on their knowledge
through an exam system.139 Passing the exam system would be the pre-requisite for political
office. This is the final step in realizing Kang’s benevolent authoritariansim – establishing
Confucian officials within the government. Kang claims that Confucian scholars would hold the
power to support, or dissent and confront government policy.140 It is important to note that
Kang’s plan does not seek to eliminate the CCP. Rather, through the educational system, Party
members would be educated in Confucian orthodoxy. In this sense, Kang’s model replaces
Communist ideology with Confuican orthodoxy. As such the CCP could be renamed the Chinese
Confucian Party. The Confucian orthodoxy, as enforeced by the Confucian educated officials,
would serve to provide legimitacy and harmony to social rule.
This three-pronged Confucianization, involving orthodoxy, education and scholar
officials, is historically rooted in a tradition of political Confucianism establshed in the Han
dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE). During the Han dynasty, the new empire realized that although the
state was conquered by military might a form of “civil bureaucracy” was necessary to maintain
power and organize the dynasty.141 In the second century B.C.E., the Han dynasty established the
Imperial University for studying Confucianism. By the first century C.E. one-hundred officials
assumed their role in the government after successfully passing an examination system based on
Confucian classical texts.142 Confucianism became the core-curriculum of education during the
Han dynasty. In other words, the Han dynasty institutionalized Confucian education within the
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governing system. This form of education persisted through 1911 when the last traditional
dynasty fell. With that Confucianism became intrinsic not only to civil bureaucracy, but also to
the education of the political elite. Like the Han Confucian system, Kang envisions an
educational system that teaches government officials Confucian orthodoxy.
Although Kang advocates an authoritarian scheme he includes a system of public voice
within the benevolent government. He cites the Book of Shang, “What Heaven sees is what we
the people see; what Heaven hears is what we the people hear.”
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The government must be

vigilent of the will of Heaven and the will of the people. If the government has achieved
harmony and social order, then it will possess the will of the people as well as the will of
Heaven. In order to ensure that Kang’s benevolent government secures the will of the people,
Kang proposes three mechanisms for voicing public opinion. First, the liberalization of mass
media should be used to allow public dissent or support of the government be voiced, unlike the
largely state-sponsored news agencies in the PRC today. Second, Kang purports a system
of “administrative politics” or “administrative absorption politics.” 144 This is a means of
consultation from different interest groups before a government makes a decision. Kang claims
that this system has already been successfully used in Hong Kong and Mainland China. This also
quells the claim that Kang’s benevolent authoritarianism is like any other form of single-party
rule. Corporatism, the third method, is similar to administrative absorption. Corporatism is a
form of unionizing people around their profession. Such organizations need to be established on
democratic practices to ensure that they will recognize their constituents. 145 This is
simultaneously a method of ensuring public voice affects government policy and the resolution
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of conflicts and legislature, while also limiting the role the people have in their government.
There are several similarities between the political Confucian models of Kang and Jiang.
Both believe that China’s national moral crises can only be resolved through a Confucian
system. Applying Jiawen Ai’s typology, both Kang and Jiang are Confucians, as opposed to
liberal or socialist Confucianists. They are opposed to any political form that is not established
on the Confuican tradition. Regarding Sebastien Billioud’s typology, Kang and Jiang are
adherents; they clearly adhere to classical Confucian principles.
That said, there are also many differences between these two new Confucians. Namely,
although Kang and Jiang are both non-party intelligentsia who seek to implement a politicoreligious Confucianism, they each espouse different Confucian teachings. Jiang believes that the
Gongyang tradition and Dong Zhongshu provide the best model for Political Confucianism. As
the Gongyang is based on The Spring and Autumn, which Confucius authored, Jiang believes
that it provides a Political Confucianism that is most accurate to the teachings of Confucius.
Kang, on the other hand, supports a model of benevolent government established on the teaches
of Mencius. These two New Confucians offer two distinct revisionings of the Confucian
tradition in order to address the issues of China’s modernity.
Conclusion
A nuanced typology of the Confucian revival involves categorizing the multitude of
political afiliations, motivations, and actions of New Confucian intellectuals. Furthermore, one
must historicize the Confucian intellectual, as well as contextualize the relationship between the
Confucian intellectual and the state. This is demonstrated in the statist / non-statist dichotomy, as
the Confucian intellectual has historically played the role of state institution as well as state
critique. This is demonstrated in the contemporary setting with the differences between Fang
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Keli and Jiang Qing in the 1980s. The above sections also demonstrate the dynamism across the
Confucian revival. Beyond the statist and non-statist division, Ai and Billioud provide or more
detailed analysis of political affiliation and motitivations. However, the above discussion of
Kang and Jiang demonstrated further dynamism. Jiang and Kang embody similar political
affiliation and motivations, envisioning political Confucianism based on the Classical
Confucianism. However, they provide two different models of political re-structuring for the
CCP. The differences between statists and non-statists, as well the differences between Jiang and
Kang, reflect that the movement is fragmented by various and at times contradictory
motivations. This demonstrates that the reappraisal of Confucianism for Chinese modernity is
pluralistic and complex.
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Chapter Four
New Confucianism, Education, and Politics:
The Confucian Revival movement in Education
Introduction
This chapter examines the role education plays in the contemporary Confucian revival in
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Historically, education was fundamental to the Confucian
tradition. Therefore it is not surprising that the Confucian revival involves an increasing number
of educational institutions dedicated to Confucianism. Since the turn of the 21st century there
has been a significant development – the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has begun to play a
central role in the establishment of Confucian learning institutions. Consequently, the CCP and
Confucian education share a complex relationship. This chapter will explore this relationship and
the role of Confucian education in the PRC.
The first section of this chapter examines the political role of Confucian education
and the Confucian intellectual between the Warring States period (403-221 BCE) and the Han
dynasty (206 BCE- 220 CE). This section asserts that the role of the Confucian intellectual
and Confucian education involves a tension between state and non-state interests. Confucian
intellectuals and the Imperial University legitimized the Han dynasty. However, section one
will argue that Confucian intellectuals also functioned as a voice of dissent, holding the emperor
accountable to the Way of Heaven. Through examining the relationship between the CCP and
Confucian education institutions, the subsequent three sections posit that the current Confucian
revival involves the same confluence demonstrated during this classical Confucian historical
period.
The second section addresses the establishment of Confucian educational organizations in
the PRC. Specifically, it examines the CCP’s establishment of Confucian educational institutions
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within state universities, as well as the party’s endorsement of private Confucian academies.
The third section discusses trends in moral education since the turn of the 21st century. Under
the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, moral education consisted of political ideological
teachings that supported socialism. However, in the past two decades the CCP has transformed
the content of moral education. One of the most important transformations is replacing socialist
ideology with an ideology that applies traditional Confucian ideals. The CCP has implemented
Confucian teachings within moral education. This discussion consists of an analysis of Zhu
Xiaowan’s research on moral education. Zhu is an educational policy adviser in the CCP and
her work is dedicated to reforming moral education policy. Lastly, this chapter examines a case
study of Anqing Number 1 Middle School, located in Anhui Province, China. I conducted this
case study during the summer of 2011 while interning at the middle school. An interview with
the Shen Bo, principal of the school, demonstrates that the educational philosophy of the school
administration is motivated by Confucian morality.
Confucian education, historically and in the present-day PRC, involves the confluence of
state and non-state interests and activism. The state interest and activism refers to the state’s role
in reviving Confucianism. This is demonstrated in section one, where the Han dynasty adopted
Confucian civil bureaucracy and education; this is also discussed in sections two through four,
where the role of the CCP in Confucian education institutions is discussed. The Confucian
tradition also involves non-state interests and activism. The Confucian revival is spearheaded
by members of the Chinese intelligentsia with a range of motivations and affiliations. Thus, the
revival demonstrates a historical tension between the statist and non-statist role of Confucian
intellectuals and Confucian education in China. Again, this is demonstrated during the preHan period and Han dynasty in section one, as well as the contemporary period in sections two
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through four.
Education and the role of the Confucian intellectual in ancient China
In order to understand the impact of Confucianism on education in the PRC one must
first examine the historical role of Confucian education and the Confucian intellectual in China.
To this end this section examines the work of Tu Weiming, an internationally recognized and
published scholar of Confucianism. Tu’s book The Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the
Confucian Intellectual explores the political, cultural, and social role of the Confucian
intellectual in ancient China. This section introduces the transforming political role of the
Confucian intellectual between the Warring States period (403-221 BCE) and the Han dynasty
(206 BCE- 220 CE). This time period presents several important historical trends in the
relationship between Confucian intellectuals and the Chinese government. Namely, the role of
the Confucian intellectual, which involves the confluence of state and non-state interests. In
other words, the Confucian intellectual is historically part of and separate from the state –
simultaneously serving the dynastic government and holding the emperor accountable to the
authority of Heaven. Education is central to the political and social role of the Confucian
intellectual.
The Confucian project did not begin as a political movement of the state. Rather,
Confucianism developed as a movement of intellectuals outside of the state apparatus in ancient
China. Classical Confucian humanism emerged in the 6th century BCE, established by the
teachings of Confucius (551-479 BCE) and his disciples, principally Mencius (371-289 BCE)
and Xunzi (298-238 BCE).146 The establishment of Confucianism coincides with the fall of Zhou
marked by the Warring States period (403-221). The Warring States refers to the time period
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when several small states contended for control and unification of China under one dynasty. This
period ended when the state of Qin united China in 221 BCE. Although Confucianism was
developing during the Warring States period, it was only one of the existing intellectual
traditions at the time.147 Compared to other intellectual traditions in China, Tu argues, “The
Confucian intellectual… was relatively weak vis-à-vis the power structure of his time.” 148
According to Tu, from Confucius’ lifetime to the establishment of the Han dynasty in 206 BCE,
the Confucian intellectual did not wield significant political influence over the states of ancient
China. Tu cites several examples to support his claim. He argues that the state of Eastern Zhou
(8th – 5th century BCE), “was uncongenial to the Confucian project” because it involved
moralizing the relationship between the ruler and his subjects.149 Tu also cites Mencius’ efforts
and ultimate failure in establishing Confucian influence in the political arena. 150 Mencius, much
like other Confucians, did not hold significant political power during the pre-Han period. This
indicates that Confucianism did not develop as a political movement, but as an intellectual
tradition at the periphery of dominant political philosophies.
Beginning in the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 BCE) the Confucian intellectuals’ political
influence grew drastically, as Confucian scholars played a prominent role in the state
bureaucracy. Although prior to the Han dynasty Confucian intellectuals did not hold political
power, “they did become a social force exerting powerful control over the cultural system.” 151 In
other words, before the Han dynasty Confucianism emerged as a prominent social and cultural
system in spite of lacking political authority. Tu argues that the Confucian intellectual became
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a “social force” because of the role of education within the Confucian tradition. Tu
claims, “Confucian monopoly on education may have been the single most important factor for
the reemergence of the Confucian intellectual in the Han dynasty.”152 During the Han dynasty,
the new empire realized that although the state was conquered by military might a form of “civil
bureaucracy” was necessary to maintain power and organize the dynasty.153 Given the Confucian
intellectuals’ cultural and social prominence, the Han dynasty viewed Confucianism as a
resource for creating a civil society. Thus the civil bureaucracy of the Han dynasty was
comprised of Confucian scholars. Additionally, during the second century B.C.E. the Han
dynasty adopted an Imperial University for studying Confucianism. By the first century C.E.
countless officials assumed their role in the government only after successfully passing an
examination system based on Confucian classical texts.154 Confucianism became the corecurriculum of education during the Han dynasty, institutionalizing Confucian education within
the governing system. With that, Confucianism became intrinsic not only to civil bureaucracy,
but also to the education of the political elite.
The political institutionalization of Confucian education transformed the role of the
Confucian intellectual in Chinese society and politics. In spite of his political office, moral
rectitude rather than political power was the priority of the Confucian intellectual. Specifically,
the Confucian intellectual “defines what politics is from the centre of his moral being.” 155 The
Confucian intellectual believed that moral rectitude was required for any political and social
order. The Confucian intellectual held the will of the people and Heaven as the measure of the
morality of a governing body. Tu argues that Confucian officials assumed the role of
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the “spokesperson” of the people and “witness” of the Mandate of Heaven. The Confucian
proverb, “Heaven sees as the people see and heaven hears as the people hear,” illustrates the
concern of the Confucian intellectual for morality in political rule.156 Although Confucian
intellectuals held political office, they served as a check and balance on the political power of the
governing Han dynasty. The Confucian intellectual objected if the ruler was immoral and
compromised the will of the people and the Mandate of Heaven. Moreover, Tu argues that the
dissenting role of the Confucian intellectual was not limited to the political arena alone. He
writes,
the impression that the Confucian bureaucrat could only voice his discontent from within
[the state] and that he was incapable of radical protest outside his social role rails to
account for the Confucian ability to mobilize massive psychic energy by a direct appeal
to transcendental principle…157
Holding political office, the Confucian intellectual did not simply serve the Han emperor,
but rather critiqued the ruler when needed. The above quote demonstrates that the Confucian
intellectual exacted this dissent from within and without the state. On the one hand, the
Confucian intellectual dissented within the political arena. On the other hand, Confucianism held
far-reaching social and cultural influence and was able to critique the ruling dynasty from outside
the state mechanism.
Dong Zhongshu, an eminent Confucian scholar of the Han dynasty, exemplified the
radicalism of the Confucian intellectual. Dong Zhongshu did not support the notion of divine
power of a ruler, but argued for holding the emperor responsible to the people and Heaven.
Dong’s concept, “the mutual responsiveness of heaven and man”158 is important for
understanding his ideas regarding the accountability of the emperor. The notion of a responsive
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Heaven reflects the Confucian concept of moral metaphysics. Within Dong’s cosmology, the
universe, including Heaven, is responsive to the moral rectitude of the people and the ruler. This
means that the cosmos is sympathetic to the leadership of the emperor. Simply, if the emperor
ruled immorally, the human world and Heaven would be in disorder. In this sense it was the role
of the Confucian intellectual to hold the ruler accountable, paying close attention to the will of
the people and Heaven.159 This means that the ruler was not an absolute authority; rather, the
Confucian officials could, and did, question the emperor’s leadership.
The Confucian tradition began as an intellectual movement exerting social and cultural
influence before gaining a political role in the Han. Although Confucianism enjoyed political
institutional power for centuries and throughout dynasties, the pre-Han period demonstrates that
the Confucian project is historically a cultural intellectual movement, not a political movement.
Certainly, the Confucians were involved in politics before, during and after the Han dynasty.
This is illustrated through the early efforts to politically assert the teachings of Confucius,
exemplified by Mencius. More significantly, statism is demonstrated in the Han dynasty where
the Confucian civil bureaucracy served to maintain the order and legitimacy of the emperor.
Such a bureaucracy was vital to the authority and longevity of the dynasty. However, the
Confucian intellectual was not an instrument of the state, but served as a check and balance on
the actions of the emperor. The Confucian intellectual dissented from within the Han
bureaucracy. Non-statism is illustrated as the Confucian project began outside of the political
arena as a social and cultural force in the pre-Han period. Even with the creation of a Confucian
bureaucracy, Confucian intellectuals believed and reinforced the ultimate authority of Heaven.
It must be emphasized that education is central to the establishment of the Confucian
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intellectual in dynastic China. It was through education that the Confucian project asserted itself
as a social force and ultimately entered Han bureaucracy. Through education Confucianism
became further institutionalized, as the Han officials passed through Confucian universities.
Confucian education during the Han dynasty exemplifies the confluence of state and non-state
interests. Education was a bureaucratic instrument of the Han dynasty. However, the Confucian
curriculum emphasized the morality of rule, assessed by the will of the people and the Mandate
of Heaven.
This historical examination of the Confucian intellectual and the role of Confucian
education is significant for the discussion of education in the Confucian revival. Much like the
Confucian project in the pre-Han period, the Confucian revival began as an intellectual
movement concerning Chinese society and culture, not as a political movement. However, much
like the transformation during the Han dynasty, currently the Chinese Communist Party has
given political support to Confucianism through the establishment of Confucian educational
institutions. This is not to say that Confucianism plays the same bureaucratic role as it did during
the Han dynasty. However, as it did in the dynastic period, Confucian education in the PRC
today involves the confluence of state and non-state, populous interests.
Institutionalizing Confucian Education in the People’s Republic of China

The increase in Confucian educational institutions beginning at the turn of the 21st
century is an important trend in the Confucian revival. At the turn of the 21st century, the
Chinese Communist Party began organizing Confucian educational institutions. The party
endorsed schools for studying Confucianism at state sponsored universities, such as Beida
and Renda, which educate party members and Chinese elite. At the same time, non-party
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intellectuals also began establishing private Confucian academies. Although private academies
are independent from national universities, academies are required to have state approval in order
to operate. However, Confucian educational institutions are not established by the CCP alone.
In fact, the effort of non-party intellectuals and populous demand are prominent factors behind
the increase in Confucian education organizations. Thus, Confucian education at the academy
and university level is prompted by both statist and non-statist elements. As discussed in the
previous chapter, statist and non-statist are two useful categories of analysis regarding the new
Confucian movement. Statist motivations refers to the Party’s endorsement of, or adherence to,
Confucianism. Conversely, Non-statist motivations refers to the social movement outside of
Party-affiliated academic and political elite. Although statist and non-statist motivations conflict,
they are both present within the institutionalization of Confucianism in educational organizations
of all levels.
Sebastien Billioud and Joel Thoraval provide one of the most comprehensive
examinations of the educational institutionalization of Confucianism in Mainland China to
date. “Jiaohua: The Confucian Revival in China as an Educative Project,” published in 2007
in China Perspectives, discusses the prominence of new Confucianism within the various
educational venues. Billioud and Thoraval’s fieldwork illuminates how contending statist
and non-statist interests define the institutionalization of Confucianism in education. Billioud
and Thoraval characterize the Confucian educational phenomenon by a traditional Chinese
term meaning moral transformation through education (jiaohua 教化). This term refers to
the “transformation of self and training dispensed to others” and it “occurs at a specific historical
juncture in which past ‘traditions’ as well as future projects, both realistic and utopian, contribute
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to the affirmation of the role of Chinese culture.”160 In other words, the Confucian educational
project is part of the revival aimed at empowering traditional culture to redefine itself and the
future of the nation.
The ideal of moral transformation through education has a long history within the
Confucian tradition. Dong Zhongshu, one of the most important Confucians of the Han dynasty,
claimed that the imperial Confucian university system was the ultimate source of jiaohua. 161
Dong Zhongshu believed that education was not only the means of propagating the teachings of
Confucius, but also of transforming the individual and society. As discussed in the first section
of this chapter, the university has played a central role in the Confucian civil bureaucracy. The
university educated the state officials and imbued the political system with Confucian teachings.
By applying this term to contemporary China, Billioud and Thoraval imply a connection between
present day national universities and those of the Han dynasty. They argue that the CCP is
educating elite and officials with Confucianism in contemporary national universities. Before
addressing Confucianism in the national universities of the PRC, the following discussion
addresses the transformations of Confucian education in the PRC during the first decade of the
21st century.
The first important trend of the 21st century has been the popularization of Confucian
education. This is where the elite are no longer the only social group with access to or interest
in studying Confucianism.162 This also refers to Confucianism spreading from elite to popular
culture. During the 1980’s and 1990’s, studying Confucianism or the classical texts was not
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a widespread or grassroots phenomenon; before the turn of the 21st century, academics and
elite studied the classics. However, within the last decade Confucianism and the classics have
become accessible to almost anyone in China.163 One example of this trend is the “children read
classics” movement.164 Currently, it is common for children’s sections of bookstores to include a
children’s classics section.165 The classics are also taught in a number of academies throughout
the country.
The final trend in Confucian education that Billioud and Thoraval describe is the
establishment of Confucian educational institutions. There are three dimensions to this process
of institutionalization – religious, political, and educational.166 For New Confucians such as
Kang and Jiang, all three dimensions go hand in hand. It is important to note that before the
Communists discredited Confucianism in the 20th century, the tradition enjoyed institutional
power in these three areas as well. However, unlike the dynastic period, Confucianism does
not currently hold institutional authority in the PRC. As such, the movement to institutionalize
Confucianism is more fragmented at local, regional and national levels.Through the following
discussion of Confucian educational institutions this section will illustrate the confluence of
statist and non-statist efforts to revive Confucianism.
The relationship between educational institutions and the state is complex. There are
many challenges to implementing the study of Confucianism within the educational system. In
spite of the post-Mao reforms, Billioud and Thoraval argue that the educational system was
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established under Mao and is therefore directed by the CCP.167 This CCP control makes it
difficult to introduce a new ideological teaching into public schools. As such, “educative
practices based on ‘Confucianism’ may consider the modern institution of schools and
universities as either an ally or adversary.”168 Given this tense relationship between
Confucianism and educational organizations, there are three common strategies of
institutionalizing Confucianism within education. Establishing an educational organization of
Confucianism involves either a complementary, rival, or substitutive relationship with the state
endorsed educational system.169 A complementary strategy is one which works within the
existing educational institutions. Schools of academic research devoted Confucianism at existing
universities and party schools are one example of a complimentary strategy. A rival strategy, on
the other hand, deliberately establishes rival institutions. An example of this strategy would be to
start a private learning academy aimed at teaching Confucianism. The last strategy creates new
educational opportunities for “non-academic organizations.”170 This strategy speaks to the trend
of businesses or other organizations to adopt an educational model that focuses on Confucianism
or the classics. Contemporary Confucian educational institutions may involve all three
educational strategies.
The establishment of Confucian educational organizations in academia illustrates the
simultaneous interplay of statist and non-statist motivations. For instance, Renda was established
as a university with a close political relationship with the CCP; the school is intended to produce
cadres who support the party. However, in 2001 the school became the first in the nation to erect
a statue of Confucius and in 2002 established the “Institute for Confucian Research (Kongzi
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yanjiuyuan孔子研究远).”171 Billioud argues, “this testifies to the current shift of the Communist
Party line towards a selective and critical re-appropriation of traditional culture.” 172 Historically
Renda shared a close relationship with the CCP. In this sense the school’s Confucian research
may be categorized as statist; Renda as a Party university reflects the growing interest of the
state in pursuing Confucianism. While these interests may be characterized as statist, there are
conflicting perspectives towards the new Confucian education within Renda. A director of the
Institute for Confucian Research explains that higher education is in the middle of two
movements concerning Confucianism. The first is an academic movement, which involves
scholars at the university level. The second is a social movement, which “aims to promote
confidence in one’s own culture and attend to the questions of spiritual life (jingshen shenghuo
精神生活) in the context of material development of society.”173 However, the pursuit of
Confucianism is still disputed by cadres that adhere more strictly to Marxist-Leninism and Mao
Zedong thought.
Beida and Qinghua universities are another example of conflicting, yet coexisting,
perspectives of Confucian education. In 2006 the two prestigious universities began
offering, “National Studies Classes (guoxueban国学办) for cadres and company managers.”174
Upon visiting the classes in 2006 Billioud and Thoraval observed, “the sessions we were able to
attend in 2006 did not include any nationalist ideology and focused on familiarizing the
participants with classical language and culture.”175 Although the class was offered at a
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university of high national standing for China’s elite and party members, the class did not teach
socialist ideology. Rather, the participants were motivated by having “access to culture that was
previously inaccessible and to resources for existential or spiritual fulfillment.” 176 Participants
are inspired by personal fulfillment through exploring traditional culture. This speaks to a social
phenomenon in which individuals identify with traditional culture as a process of meaning
making for their contemporary lives.
The establishment of Confucian education at Renda, Beida, and Qinghua demonstrate the
presence of a dialectic relationship between statist and non-statist motivations. In each instance,
Confucian education is supported by and dependent on the state. This is illustrated as the
university is fundamental to the institutionalization of Confucian education. These institutions
are state endorsed and educate Chinese Communist Party members, as well as the Chinese elite
of other professions. While these educational projects rely on the Party, the content of Confucian
education speaks to the non-statist dimension of the Confucian revival. The participants in the
class do not study Confucianism in the interest of political or economic gain. As described in the
above paragraph, the participants studying Confucianism are interested in cultural and spiritual
fulfillment. However, the absence of teaching socialist ideology does not suggest that Confucian
education is politically neutral. Rather Billioud and Thoraval observe,
While [the] long-term ideal [of Confucian education] distances it from the type of
rationality that governs the university, it nevertheless continues to depend on permanent
exchanges with the academic community whose validity it questions.177
The Confucian education programs call into question the “rationality” of the academic settings
they occupy. The tension between the statist and non-statist dimensions in Confucian education
is clear. Confucian education is dependent on the CCP-sponsored university, yet it is separate
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from the university in terms of philosophical ideology.
The same interplay between state and non-state motivations is involved in private
Confucian learning academies. One example is the Academy of Peace and Harmony (Pinghe
Shuyuan 平和书院), a Confucian Academy in Zhuhai founded in 2005. This academy was
established to teach Confucian classics and practice Confucian rituals. Although its founder
lacks formal education in Confucianism, the academy works closely with new Confucians such
as Jiang Qing.178 It is a private school, which means the founder chose to establish an
educational organization independent of the university. However, the Academy of Peaceful
Harmony is dependent on the state, as it relies on its status as, “an official member of
the ‘Association for Research on Traditional Culture; (Chuantong wenhua yanjiuhui 传统文化
研究会), which is registered with a department of the local government.”179 Without this
registration, the academy would not be allowed to operate. Billioud and Thoraval describe this
academy as rival to the university system. The Academy of Peaceful Harmony is independent of
the university system, consists of non-party members, and is presumably opposed to state
politics given its relationship with Jiang Qing. As with the universities, private Confucian
education involves the convergence of statist and non-statist efforts. The academies are private
and critical of the CCP, yet rely on the CCP for endorsement.
Confucian educational institutions at any level requires the interplay and interdependence
of the state and populous. This suggests that the Confucian revival involves the convergence of
Party and Populous movements. Regarding the popularization and institutionalization of
Confucianism Billioud and Thoraval write,
The fact that these initiatives often emanate from the ‘people’ (however this term may be
178
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interpreted) indicates that they are not purely ideological phenomena that can be reduced
to mere political instrumentalization or the invention of a new cultural market. 180
Confucian education is in part a populous movement, as it “emanates from people.” The
university setting reflects this popularization; personal interests in cultural and spiritual
fulfillment rather than political or economic profit can motivate the participants in the university
classes. Therefore political or economic “instrumentalization” is not the primary motivation
behind Confucian institutions at the university level. Private academies also demonstrate
popularization; private citizens, rather than the CCP, organize these educational initiatives.
Like the discussion in the first section, the Confucian education project in the present
day involves the confluence of the state and the populous. At Renda, Beida, and Qinghua,
the government has established Confucian learning for Chinese elite. Although this is not the
same as the Han dynasty Imperial University, it demonstrates that the Party actively supports
Confucian education for Party members and elite. Moreover, the Party is not the only cause
for the establishment of these learning institutions. Rather, the people are the impetus for
Confucian learning. This is demonstrated where the people are concerned not with political and
economic gain, but out of cultural and spiritual fulfillment. In the Han dynasty, the prominence
of Confucianism as a social and cultural force was a significant factor in the institutionalization
of Confucian education. Similarly, in the present day, interest in Confucianism ‘emanates from
the people’ as a populous movement, which has created state institutional support. The party has
created an ideological space that at times conflicts with and criticizes Party actions and policy.
Even though Confucian education at the university and private level is critical of socialism,
the CCP supports these educational institutions. Confucian education is a Party and populous
movement that simultaneously supports and critiques the Chinese Communist Party.
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Current Trends in Moral Education
At the same time that Confucian education has become increasingly widespread and
institutionalized in state affiliated universities and private academies, the CCP has also
promulgated a series of new directives concerning moral education to be implemented at the
primary and secondary level. This section presents the changes to moral education curriculum in
the past two decades, as well as an example of CCP research on moral education directed at
advising future moral curriculum. The moral education policy described in this section illustrates
that the CCP is reviving Confucianism within the educational system. Like the previous
examples, state efforts to implement Confucian ideology does not mean that the Confucian
revival is a statist project alone. Rather, the state’s directives are confluent with a populous
movement aimed at reviving traditional culture.
In the Maoist era, moral education was directed at maintaining the socialist
character of schools and the individuals they educated. The term moral education is transposable
with ideological education or political education.181 This suggests that the ideology diffused
through moral education joins the concepts of social and political ethics. Wing On Lee and Chi
Hang Ho, scholars from the University of Sydney, Australia and the Hong Kong Institute of
Education respectively, have identified a transformation in moral education since the 1990s.
These two scholars argue that until 1978 moral education was socialist, political education.
Beginning in the 1990s the emphasis of moral education shifted to individual ethics.182 The
publication of a new syllabus by the Ministry of Education in 2002 demonstrates this change in
moral education. The ministry emphasizes, “The person as the foundation of education”

181

Lee, Wing On, and Chi Hang Ho. "Ideopolitical Shifts and Changes in Moral Education Policy in
China." Journal of Moral Education 4 (2005): pp. 413
182 Ibid: pp. 414

97

with “curriculum [that] is focused on cultivating civilized behaviors and habits, good moral
quality and healthy social development…”183 Lee and Ho suggest that this change in moral
education is correlative to economic, social, and political modernization in the past two decades.
This indicates that moral education curriculum is not dogmatic but is responsive to social
transformation and modernization. Confucian morality has emerged as one of the most recent
transformations of contemporary moral education.
The work of Zhu Xiaowan concerning moral education policy reflects the connection
between moral education and the Confucian revival. However, it is important to note that Zhu
is first and foremost a member of the Chinese Communist Party. As such her education policy
reflects statist interests. Zhu’s career in the education field is the best indication of her statist
proclivities. Zhu serves as the President and Party Secretary of the Central Office of Educational
Research and as a national school inspector.184 Zhu is employed by the state to conduct
education research and observe schools. Also her research is published in journals affiliated with
the CCP. The article discussed in this section, “Facing the Challenge: Adjusting and Innovating
Moral Education in Schools” (mianduitiaozhan: xuexiao daodejiaoyu de tiaozheng yu gaixin
面对挑战：学校道德教育的调整与该新), was published in Education Research (jiaoyu
yanjiu 教育研究), which is closely connected to the Communist party. This journal’s mission
is to “investigate the educational system of Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (tantaoyou
zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi jiaoyu lilin tixi 探讨有中国特色的社会主义教育理论体系).185
This suggests that the intent of this publication is to support and guide the party’s mission of
implementing Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.
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In “Facing the Challenge: Adjusting and Innovating Moral Education in Schools” published
in Education Research in 2011, Zhu asserts the importance of moral education for the future of
the PRC. Zhu argues that modernity has created a number of crises that affect China’s youth as
well as the nation as a whole. According to Zhu, China’s development in the last two decades
is problematic for national culture and the future of the country’s youth. Globalization and
economic growth pose problems to the culture of any developing or developed country.186
In China specifically Zhu is critical of the ‘Reform and Open China to the outside world’
policy that has guided China’s economic liberalization since the end of the 20th century. Zhu
acknowledges progress made in economics, technology, and education. However, progress has
jeopardized Chinese culture. Namely, Zhu argues that China’s culture has been transformed
into a consumer culture (“wenhua de shanyehua 文化的商业化”).187 The problem is caused by
focusing on “economic development and technological progress” (jingji de fazhan he keji de
jinbu 经济的发展和科技的进步) to the exclusion of cultural values.188 Priority has been given
to progress and rather than culture in China.
The crises of Chinese culture also present a series of problems for the current generation
of Chinese youth. Zhu writes,
In the continued process of Reform and Open Policy will inevitably magnify the series of
difficult problems faced by education (在中国继续推进改革开放的进程中必然会进一
步放大教育所面临的一系列难题).189
According to Zhu the challenges for China’s school-aged youth include turbulent employment
circumstances for parents, as well as academic pressure, competing for grades and ultimately
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for employment.190 Education does not serve a cultural or moral goal, but rather economic
imperatives. In other words, education is a matter of achieving economic success and gainful
employment in the liberal market economy. Therefore education is not equipped to address
this national crisis; education lacks a cultural or moral compass. Zhu summarizes the impact of
societal transformation on Chinese youth,
Living in a ‘consumerism as purpose, information-based, advertising as the driving force’
type of culture, children have seen and experience too much before they are mature
enough(身处在一种“以消费为目的,以信息为基础,以广告作驱动”的文化中,孩子们在
尚未成熟之前就已经看到和经历过太多太多).191
China’s consumer culture creates not only a moral vacuum for the nation, but a moral and
cultural crises for the country’s youth.
Given the moral and cultural condition, moral education is a necessity in the PRC.
According to Zhu a reassessment of moral education is needed to address the problems created
by globalization and modernization. Zhu writes,
…Especially, the schools need to emphasize the moral education on younger generation.
Not only because schools have the scientific and cultural advantage on personal value
systems and morality, but also because the integral and complete humanism that the
school may have in its education values will help the younger generation with a moral
basis (…尤其需要加强学校对未成年一代的思想道德教育，这不仅因为学校对于个
体道德发展的精神世界的形成具有科学和文化意义上的优势，而且学校教育可能特
有的那种统一和完整的人道主义的育人价值观将有助于青少年奠定品德基础).192
Zhu acknowledges the powerful role that schooling plays in the formation of cultural and moral
values. Because of this significance schools can serve as a site of formation of cultural identity
and morality. Schools must provide a moral education based on the humanism (rendao zhuyi 人
道主义) China’s consumer culture is filled with competition. Focusing on the humanism will
provide students with humanitarian values. This will balance out the dog-eat-dog competitive
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culture given the current economic goals of education.
Lastly, Zhu’s arguments for policy reformation reflect historical trends in moral
education discussed by Lee and Ho. Zhu argues that modern consumerism marginalizes
social and cultural morality. Moral education should educate individuals with concern for
humanitarianism. This reflects the sentiments of the Ministry of Education publication cited
by Lee and Ho where the state emphasized teaching individuals “good moral quality and
healthy social character.”193 Not only does Zhu’s education policy resemble the trends of moral
education described by Lee and Ho, but they also resonate with the sentiments of the new
Confucian movement.
Comparing Zhu and Kang Xiaoguang demonstrates the similar trends in moral education
policy and the beliefs of the new Confucians. Both Zhu and Kang are concerned with the effects
of the market structure and economic growth on the Chinese nation. Kang writes, “market
orientation has not only changed China’s economic structure, but also its political and social
structure, and even its culture and ideology.”194 As a Party member, Zhu does not critique the
CCP. However, Zhu and Kang would both agree that economic liberalization changed China’s
cultural values. Zhu and Kang also agree that the current system is devoid of morality. Kang
critiques the “heartless-rich” and the “heartless government” whereas Zhu is primarily concerned
with the cultural crises.195 However, they agree that there is a social crises in the PRC given the
prioritization of rampant economic growth.
Kang and Zhu both propose teaching a traditional ideology to address China’s current
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issues. For instance, Kang argues, “China’s future should emerge from its tradition and should
be constructed in accordance with the spirit of Confucianism.”196 Zhu, on the other hand, does
not explicitly endorse Confucianism but does support incorporating traditional moral norms in
moral education. Specifically Zhu argues that moral education should center on “humanism”
(rendao zhuyi 人道主义). While Zhu does not support a Confucian curriculum, both argue for
filling China’s current ethical vacuum with traditional morality. Given this support of traditional
morality, Kang and Zhu provide a critique of Marxist and Liberal ideology. Kang directly
opposes Marxism and Liberalism as foreign systems that lack legitimacy. He proposes replacing
Marxist teachings in party schools with teaching Confucian texts.197 Zhu is more tacit in her
suggestion to replace Marxism. Zhu does not critique the Marxism or liberalism outright.
However, Zhu proposes teaching humanism rather than Marxism. This implies that Marxism is
incapable of providing the moral direction that the nation requires.
Finally, Zhu and Kang both support the Substance-Function (ti yong 体用) strategy for
solving China’s national issues. The Ti Yong argument was proposed during the final decades of
the Qing dynasty as a means of adopting Western learning while preserving Chinese cultural
identity. This was an educational scheme that suggested that Chinese learning be preserved as
the essence (ti 体) where as Western learning and technology was applied (yong 用).
In “Confucianization: a Future in the Tradition”, substance and function is illustrated in Kang’s
model of Benevolent government. Kang claims to apply Western ideas to his model of
government. For instance, Kang explains that corporatism, a means of organizing individuals
into groups for political representation and participation, is a Western concept that he applies to
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his model of government. However, Confucianism is the essence of Kang’s government, as he
proposes a “Confucian State” in which Confucian culture is the foundation of Chinese society. 198
Similarly Zhu is concerned with preserving Chinese essence while implementing Western
techniques or models. However, again Zhu is more discrete in her critique and proposed
solution. Zhu holds modernization, globalization and economic growth accountable for many of
China’s social-cultural crises. However, Zhu does not propose removing China’s free-market
economic structure. Rather, Zhu propose reforming education to emphasize morality. Zhu
believes that morality is necessary to “nurture the whole person” (peiyang wanzhengde 培养完整
的).199 Currently schools do not educate individuals completely; they lack morality. Through
emphasizing moral education, schools will educate a future generation to be concerned with
culture rather than unadulterated economic development. As such Zhu supports continued use
Western economic schema. However, moral education must be implemented to fill China’s
current moral vaccum. In this sense, both Kang and Zhu believe that empowering culture is
central to establishing a brighter future for the PRC.
Zhu’s moral education policy also relates to the teachings of classical Confucian texts
such as The Analects and The Doctrine of the Mean. Zhu’s emphasis on humanism in moral
education best exemplifies her connection to Confucian philosophy. As humanism is a central
tenet of the Confucian tradition. Humanism and the Way of Heaven (tiandao 天道) share a
responsive metaphysical relationship. Tu Weiming claims that within Confucianism the Way
of human kind cannot be separated from a metaphysical relationship with the Way of Heaven
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(天道).200 The notion of cultivating morality involves a metaphysical relationship between the
individual and the cosmos. Dong Zhongshu, the Han dynasty Confucian discussed in section
one, best described the notion of moral metaphysics as “the mutual responsiveness of heaven
and man.”201 This quote means that heaven and humanity are responsive to one another. Tu
writes, “true humanity must be sought in the anthropocosmic vision of the unity of man and
heaven.”202 True humanity is achieved through cultivating morality. Therefore morality is the
key to realizing the unity of rendao and tiandao.
Individuals cultivate morality through education. Again, the notion of transformation
through education (jiaohua 教化), is pertinent. Through education, one cultivates morality, thus
achieving a metaphysical unity with Heaven.203 The Analects also expresses the metaphysical
goal of moral education:
The master said, “at fifteen I set my heart on learning; at thirty I took my stand; at forty I
came to be free from doubts; at fifty I understood the Decree of Heaven; at sixty my ear
was attuned; at seventy I followed my heart’s desire without overstepping the line.”204
In this famous passage Confucius describes his process of education and cultivation throughout
his lifetime. He states that through his life-long education he was able to “understand the Decree
of Heaven.” Knowing Heaven is one of the educational goals for Confucius. Although this
passage does not explicitly mention the relationship between the Way of Humanity and the
Way of Heaven, it does imply that education has a transformative effect on humanity, and one
can understand heaven through education. Zhu Xiaowan does not discuss the transcendence of
Heaven, or any notion of moral metaphysics like that of classical Confucian texts. However, Zhu
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holds that humanism is central to moral education and cultivating a prosperous Chinese society.
In other words, Zhu’s moral education is a re-visioning of transformation through education;
Zhu believes that moral education is capable of transforming Chinese society. Although Zhu
does not discuss Heaven, she emphasizes humanism and believes moral education is a form of
transformative education (jiaohua 教化). In this sense, Zhu’s moral education is philosophically
connected to the Confucian teachings of The Analects and the Doctrine of the Mean.
Although Zhu is a member of the CCP, her work on moral education also demonstrates
non-statist interests. Zhu believes that spiritual fulfilment, not politics, is the goal for
Confucianizing moral education. This is illustrated where Zhu asserts that schools have influence
over “individual moral development and spiritual life” (daode fazhan de jingshenshijie 道德发
展的精神世界).205 Similarly, Billioud and Thoraval identify ‘spiritual life’ (jingshen shenghuo
精神生活) as a concern among the Chinese population motivating Confucian moral education.
Billioud and Thoraval argue that students at the national universities and private academies
paritipate in Confucian “to promote confidence in one’s own culture and attend to the questions
of spiritual life (jingshen shenghuo 精神生活) in the context of material development of
society.”206 Zhu, as well as Billioud and Thoraval demonstrate that reviving Confucian education
is motivated by cultural and spiritual concerns.
Humanism is also a common concern of Zhu’s moral education policy and the
participants of the Renda Confucian studies.207 Zhu mentions humanism in the context of
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teaching humanitarianism in moral education. The participants at Renda refer to humanism in the
context of achieving spiritual fulfillment through the teachings of Confucius. This demonstrates
that the Confucian revival in education is spearheaded by members of the Chinese intelligentsia
with a range of political affiliations and motivations. Zhu and the students from Renda are
Party intelligentsia. Zhe is a Party secretary, researching and writing educational policy for the
CCP. Renda on is responsible for educating the elite party members in the PRC. However, the
fieldwork of Billioud and Thoraval indicate that spiritual fulfillment is a prominent concern nonstatist educational contexts.208 Namely, private academies and Beida and Qinghua universities
are responsible for educating intellectuals that are not necessarily Party members.Therefore, the
same under-girding cultural concerns motivates statist and non-statist intelligentsia involved in
the Confucian revival.
Zhu’s work must be understood within the context of her position as a member of the
Communist Party. This article holds the economic progress of modernization and globalization
accountable for the social crises facing China’s educational system. However, the article
does not critique current economic policy, or suggests a new direction in economics or
politics. Rather, the article focuses on education as a way to address societal problems, while
allowing economic growth to continue. Zhu simultaneously supports the Communist Party and
educational policy that does not mention Socialism. Between Zhu credentials and the journal
of publication, it is clear that her research is directed at and supported by the party. However
supporting the Chinese Communist Party line does not mean that Zhu’s educational research
must support Socialism. The focus of Zhu’s article is moral education that does not mention any
form of Socialist political education. Rather this article emphasizes “moral character” (pinde 品
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德) and humanism.209 Zhu is able to propose an educational direction motivated by a traditional
view of moral education without contradicting the Communist party.
Zhu’s work illustrates that statist and non-statist interests influence moral education.
Zhu’s moral education involves a Confucian view of morality in education to provide Chinese
society with a moral direction in the contemporary period. However, Zhu’s work is also clearly
statist. She is a member of the Party, published in Party-affiliated magazines. Furthermore,
her moral education content does not propose a political or economic re-structuring. Thus,
Zhu exemplifies the tense relationship between the Confucian revival and the CCP. The CCP
endorses Confucian education, while ensuring that Marxist and Maoist ideology is not criticized.
Zhu also exemplifies well the common concerns throughout the Confucian revival regardless of
political affiliation. Zhu and the participants of the study of Billioud and Thoraval are concerned
with moralizing China and seeking spiritual fulfilment. Unsatisfied with China modern reality,
Party and non-Party intelligentsia alike are turning to Confucianism. Education is the ideological
space where the relationship between Confucian culture and modernity is being defined.
Anqing No. 1 Middle School: A Case Study
Education is the ideological space where the relationship between Chinese culture and
modernity is being defined - public education is no exception. This section examines the extent
to which the Confucian revival is manifest in public education in China. This section discusses
one specific case study -- the Anqing Number 1 Middle School in Anqing, Anhui Province,
China. Founded in 1906 this school’s history encompasses the political, social, and economic
transformation of the 20th century. The school also enjoys a historical relationship with the CCP
that continues to thrive through today. In the summer of 2011 I interned as an English teacher
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at Anqing No 1 Middle School. During this time I gathered texts published by the school and
conducted interviews with one of the school’s principals, Shen Bo. The materials gathered
during my research in Anqing this summer documnet the school’s political affiliation with the
CCP, as well as the perspectives of the school administrators concerning modernization and
their philosophy of moral education. Confucian values are promoted at Anqing No. 1 Middle
School. Moreover, the inclusion of Confucian ideals does not come from CCP directives. Rather,
Confucianism is included in the personal educational philosophy of the school administrators.
Thus, the movement for Confucian education at this middle school is best understood as a nonstatist movement. Anqing No. 1 Middle school demonstrates that public schools, which are
closely affiliated with the Party, engage with the non-statist Confucian movement.
The school’s publication “Anqing No. 1 Middle School: Brilliant Achievements
in a Century” commemorates the school’s centennial and documents the school’s history through
the 20th century. The school’s account of its history reflects the school’s political affiliation and
beliefs regarding modernization and globalization. The school’s history illustrates that it
identifies with the revolutionary, socialist project and is dedicated to modernization. Anqing No.
1 Middle School was founded in 1906 in response to the abolition of the imperial exam
system.210 In other words, this school was established by the late Qing dynasty as part of the
mission to modernize schools and reform the educational system dominated by the Confucian
academy. Following the fall of the Qing dynasty, members of the school supported the May
Fourth Movement. According to Brilliant Achievements in a Century, “the school has had a
revolutionary tradition for its students took an active part in the anti-imperialist movements
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therefore they gained the school the name ‘cradle of patriotic movements.’”211 The connection to
the May Fourth Era is significant as it demonstrates how the school chooses to remember its
history. The school portrays its history as revolutionary, promoting itself as the ‘cradle of
patriotic movements.’ Given the Communist Party was not founded, much less in power during
the May Fourth Movement, the school retrospectively asserts that its students and teachers have
always been united behind a socialist project. The school more clearly became affiliated with the
revolutionary, socialist movement during the 1920’s. The school established the first Communist
Youth League in the province in 1921. Then in 1923 Anqing was host to the first Communist
party organization in Anhui province, which was comprised mostly of students and teachers of
Anqing No. 1 Middle School.212 It should be emphasized that this historical account is how the
school chose to commemorate its centennial. The school remembers its history as a socialist,
revolutionary history. First, this indicates that the school has been closely connected to the
Communist Party throughout its history. Second, this suggests the school is still intimately
connected to the CCP today. In this way, Anqing No. 1 Middle School’s historical account
expresses the school commitment to political unity with the CCP.
Beyond the historical narrative, the school is explicit in its support of the CCP.
This is illustrated in several ways. First, Brilliant Achievements in a Century publication
asserts, “The school follows strictly the socialist orientation of education and dedicates itself
to the implementation of educational principles of the party and the country.”213 The school’s
political agenda supports the Chinese Community Party. Also, the principal of the school is
a local Communist Party Secretary. This role of the principal and Party Secretary has been
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maintained since the early 1970s, when the school administration began to include a local Party
Secretary.214 Lastly, the provincial Party voices its support for Anqing No. 1 Middle School.
This is exemplified where the Anhui Party Secretary sent a letter of congratulations to honor the
school’s centennial.215 Not only does the school celebrate its political connection to the Chinese
Communist Party through its historical narrative, and close relationship with the party, but the
Communist Party also expresses its support of Anqing No.1 Middle School.
The school’s centennial publication also reflects a narrative of progress and
modernization. This is best illustrated through another school motto, “education must [confront]
modernization, of the world and of the future” (“教育要面向现代化，面向世界，面向未来
”).216 The school asserts that it is part of the modernization project. Furthermore, this project
engages the entire world and the future of China. As globalization and modernization influenced
China throughout the 20th century, so too have they influenced the Anqing No. 1 Middle School.
The school not only engages in a socialist mission, but also a mission that engages modernization
and globalization. The above discussion identifies the political affiliation and concerns for
modernization and globalization of Anqing No. 1 Middle School. The school has statist
sympathies, given its affiliation with the CCP. The school also views its educational project as
directly engaging with the national trends of modernization and globalization.
A second school motto illustrates that the school is also concerned for the cultivation
of individual moral character. During an interview Shen Bo stated a school motto that fuses
traditional and modern culture. He said,
Our school motto is ‘sincerity and resolution.’ This phrase originates from ‘The
Exegesis of Characters’ (Shuowenjiezi 说文解字）, an earlier generation at our school
determined this as our school motto… our traditional and modern education together
214
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fosters the meaning of this motto (校训叫’诚毅’…源于说文解字的一种句式… 学校的
前辈就把它确定为校训诚和毅…那就说我们传统这种教育跟现代的教育来抚育这个
校训新的含义).217
The principal describes how a phrase that originates from a Han Dynasty dictionary, The
Exegesis of Characters (shuowenjiezi 说文解字), is alive at the school today. This illustrates
that the combination of traditional cultural ideals and modern education is pertinent to the
administrators of Anqing No. 1 Middle School. Furthermore, the school motto resonates with
trends in moral education described above. For instance, the principal states that these two
ideals are important for cultivating one’s character (pinge 品格). The principal also emphasizes
that education is influential to the development of Chinese society. This indicates that there is
concern for cultivation of individual character that will in turn influence society. In this sense,
the Principal's inclusion of traditional culture has two goals; development of positive individuals
and development of a positive future for society. Traditional concepts from The Exegesis of
Characters are aimed at cultivating the moral character of individual students. The principal of
Anqing No. 1 Middle School is committed to the notion that development of character is vital for
a prosperous future of Chinese society.
The sentiments of Principal Shen Bo reflect a presence of Confucianism within his
broader educational philosophy. The concepts sincerity (cheng 诚) and resoluteness (yi 毅) of the
school’s motto are also Confucian ideals that date back to classical Confucian texts. Sincerity
and resoluteness, are concepts of central importance to The Doctrine of the Mean.218 Regard
sincerity, The Doctrine of the Mean states,
Sincerity is the Way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the Way of Man. He who is
sincere is one who hits upon what is right without effort and apprehend without thinking.
He is naturally and easily in harmony with the Way. Such a man is a sage. He who tries
217
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to be sincere is one who chooses the good and holds fast to it.219
The above quotes indicates that sincerity is not an individual moral quality, but also a quality of
the Way of Heaven. Thus it represents the convergence between the Way of Human Kind and
the Way of Heaven. This is also illustrates morality is not a matter of social order alone, but also
assumes metaphysical significance. As such cultivating sincerity is important for the individual
to realize the Way of Heaven and become a sage.
Resoluteness is important for the cultivation of sincerity in The Doctrine of the Mean.
Tu Weiming, a Confucian scholar, describes the role of resoluteness in his book Centrality
and Commonality: An Essay on Chung Yong. He argues that The Doctrine of the Mean
requires “moral effort” to cultivate sincerity.220 In order to realize the Way of Heaven, one must
have “moral resolution,” which is “both the necessary and sufficient condition for education.” 221
In other words, sincerity leads to the enlightenment of the person as a sage. However, this
cultivation requires education and perserverence. Certainly, Principal Shen Bo never mentioned
Heaven, metaphysics, or sagehood. However, he does assert that the two terms from the Han
dynasty carry significance for education today. This school motto demonstrates that the school
values traditional Confucian concepts of moral education and self cultivation. More importantly,
these ideals dating back to classical Confucian texts influence the Principal’s personal
philosophy concerning moral education.
The above two sections of this chapter have demonstrated the presence of non-statist
activities to reappraise Confucianism for modern China. This movement is manifest in education,
as illustrated by Confucian education organizations and trends in moral education. The motto
expressed by principal Shen Bo suggests that the same non-statism also influences Anqing No.
219
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1 Middle School. Shen Bo’s intent behind including aspects of traditional culture is to cultivate
individuals. As stated above, this cultivation is important to the future prosperous development
of society. This school administrator believes that traditional culture is integral to the future of
the Chinese nation. It should be noted that this motto is an educational philosophy, not a state
directive or mandate concerning education curriculum. This motto is intended to guide the
practices of the school and its teachers. This illustrates Confucianism is manifest in Anqing No.
1 Middles School, not on the state but on the individual level. In other words, Shen Bo, as a nonParty intelligentsia, brought the Confucian revival into Anqing No. 1 Middle School.
There is a multiplicity of interests and influences on Anqing No. 1 Middle School. The
school asserts its commitment to the state and dedication to socialism, referring to itself as
the “cradle of patriotic movements.222 However the motto described by the school principal
reflects an emphasis on traditional culture aimed at cultivating individual character. On the one
hand this school is an ardent supporter of statist interests. Supporting the PRC is instrumental to
the continued success and recognition of the school. On the other hand, the school is also
influenced by a non-statist movement aimed at empowering culture to shape the future of
Chinese society.
Conclusion
The examples in the sections above illustrate that the Confucian revival, while a
contemporary movement, embodies the historical relationship between Confucianism and the
state. Namely throughout Chinese history, education has played a pivotal role in the Confucian
tradition and embodies the dichotomous political and social role of Confucianism in China.
Historically, Confucian education is an instrument of the state as well as part of a voice of

222

Brilliant Achievements in a Century. Anqing, Anhui, China: Anqing Number 1 Middle School, 2006: pp

4

113

dissent that critiques the actions of the state when needed. The above sections demonstrate that
the Party is closely involved in education, from the foundation of schools and universities, to the
sponsoring of private academies, and the close political affiliation of public schools in the PRC.
In many of these educational settings, Confucian education shares a close relationship to the
state. For instance, the Confucian schools at the university level that educates the elite and party
members based on classical Confucian texts. Also, the moral education policy discussed in
section three is a prime example of the state’s direct involvement in Confucian education.
However, non-Party intelligentsia are also reviving Confucian education in these settings.
University level Confucian studies, private Confucian academies, moral education policy, and
the case study of Anqing all reflect that the Confucian revival is not a movement exclusively
lead by the CCP. That said, the private Confucian academies, the moral education publications,
national universities, and Anqing No.1 Middle School are all dependent on the state. These
various educational contexts depend on state sponsorship in order to function. Thus, there is
confluence of Party and non-Party activism that shapes the Confucian revival in China today.
Examining Confucian education illustrates that the confluence of the state and non-state is not
only a trend of the contemporary Confucian revival, but is also a historical trend dating back to
pre-modern times that characterizes a long-standing historical tension between statist and nonstatist Confucian intellectuals.
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Conclusion
This thesis began with a discussion of the 2008 Olympic opening ceremony in Beijing,
China. The U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission argued that the ceremony
demonstrated the interest of the CCP in resuscitating Confucianism for its nationalist agenda.
The Commission argued that in the ideological vacuum of the post-Mao era, the CCP uses
Confucianism to propagate its economic and political policies.223 The 2008 Olympics and the
Commission’s report are significant in that they demonstrate the contemporary importance of the
Confucian revival. Confucius is being resurrected as the face of cultural nationalism by one of
the largest super powers in the present-day. The CCP’s message of Confucian cultural
nationalism was heard throughout the world; the Commission’s report demonstrates the U.S.
government recognizes the Confucian revival as an issue of great import to understanding the
CCP.
However, the conception of the Confucian revival as a CCP movement is ahistorical.
Chapter Two demonstrated that the Confucian revival is part of China’s modern history. The
Confucian revival cannot be separated from the onslaught of Westernization and modernization
during the mid-19th and 20th centuries. From the loss of the Opium War to the revolutionary
politics of Mao, Confucianism was attacked as incompatible with modernity. However, during
this time Confucian intellectuals responded to the attack of modernization from the West. New
Confucians preserved Confucianism in China’s changing political and social landscape. Mou
Zongsan’s “A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture”
exemplifies the Confucian project during the 20th century. The manifesto challenges the modern
Western idea of progress, and asserts the importance of Confucian culture to China’s national
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spirit. In other words, Mou redefines China’s modernity in terms of the Confucian tradition.
Thus, the Confucian revival is a dialogue between tradition Chinese culture and the Western
forces of modernization.
During the 20th century New Confucians were also engaged in a global discourse. Tu
Weiming, a New Confucian, writes,
“The time is long overdue to move beyond a mindset shaped by modernization as
a unilinear progression. As politics of domination fades, we welcome the drawing
of an age of communication, networking, negotiation, interaction, interfacing, and
collaboration.”224
This quote asserts that Western hegemony defines modernity and progress in terms of Western
ideals. Tu Weiming calls for global dialogue involving ‘networking, negotiation, interaction
and collaboration.’ Not only does Tu challenge the idea of modernity as Westernization, but
also encourages and participates in a ‘negotiation’ between Confucianism and other ideologies
throughout the globe. The Confucian revival is an extension of China’s history of globalization
and modernization during the 19th and 20th centuries. This demonstrates that the Confucian
revival is not only a contemporary project of the CCP. Rather it is part of a continuing process of
redefining culture in terms of tradition and modernity.
The Commission Report’s assumption that the Confucian revival is a propaganda project
of the CCP is incomplete. Chapter Three, “Towards a Typology of the New Confucianism,” and
Chapter Four, “New Confucianism, Education, and Politics,” demonstrated that intellectuals with
a variety of political affiliations and motivations revive Confucianism. The New Confucians can
be categorizes as either statist or non-statist intellectuals. Fang Keli and Jiang Qing exemplify
these two factions. Fang, Dean of Graduate Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
spearheaded a number of Confucian research projects for the CCP during the 1980s and
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1990s.225 Fang research was part of the CCP’s interest in using Confucianism to support its
nationalist agenda. Therefore, Fang is a statist Confucian intellectual. Jiang, on the other hand, is
a non-statist. Jiang also published works on Confucianism during the 1980s and 1990s, but was
not published by the CCP. Rather, Jiang was critical of the CCP support of Confucianism,
arguing that it was not genuine support of political Confucianism.226 Before the 2008 Olympics,
the CCP was engaging in the Confucian revival. However, Party-activism is only one side of the
movement. Rather the revival involves the confluence of Party and non-Party intellectuals.
New Confucians not only differ regarding political affiliations, but also in their revisioning of the Confucian tradition. Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang offer to of the most
extensive models for political Confucianism for the contemporary PRC. Even though Jiang and
Kang are both non-statists who critique the CCP, they developed two Confucian governmental
organizations, established on two distinct teaches within Confuicanism. Jiang espouses the
Gongyang tradition, where as Kang espouses the teachings of Mencius.227 The Confucian revival
is a project aimed at re-applying the Confucian tradition to the modern world. Chapter Three
demonstrates that this re-appraisal of Confucianism is a pluralistic and complex. A multitude of
voices attempt to define and redefine the Confucian tradition in China’s contemporary context.
Chapter Four continued to examine the confluence of Party and non-Party intellectuals in
the revival. Specifically, this chapter examines the role of Confucian intellectuals within various
education institutions in the PRC. The CCP actively propagates Confucian education. This is
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demonstrated in the rise of Confucian studies at national universities such as The People’s
University (Renda 人大). The CCP has illustrated further commitment to Confucian education
through its moral education policy. Zhu Xiaowan, a Party member and educational researcher,
describes the need for humanism and morality within education in China’s public schools. The
CCP is engaged in applying traditional ideology to a modern context through educational
institutions.
At the turn of the 21st century, non-Party affiliated intelligentsia began to play an active
role in Confucian education. Beijing University (Beida 北大) and Qinghua University and
private Confucian academies are not affiliated with the CCP, and are organized and taught by
non-Party members. The Principal of Anqing No. 1 Middles School also exemplifies a non-Party
intelligentsia who is committed to Confucian education. These educational contexts demonstrate
that the state as well as non-state activists spearhead the Confucian project. The prominence of
non-Party intelligentsia illustrates that Confucian education does not always conform to the
interests of the CCP.
Chapters Three and Four assert that the tension between the Confucian intellectual and
the state government has deep historical roots. Much like the contemporary Confucian revival,
the Han dynasty Confucian project involved the confluence between state and non-state
intellectuals. Confucians simultaneously legitimized and criticized the Han dynastic government.
Confucians were necessary to Han civil bureaucracy, which was responsible for the longevity
and stability of the dynasty. However, Heaven, the same source of legitimacy of the emperor,
was also the ultimate authority. The Confucian literati, as interpreters of the Way of Heaven,
held the emperor accountable to ensure morality in his rule. Similarly, in the present-day the
CCP turns to Confucianism to maintain stability and unite the nation under one ideology.
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However, non-Party Confucian intellectuals are critical of the CCP at times. Thus, the Confucian
revival is a contemporary expression of the historical tension between the intellectual and the
Chinese government.
There is no doubt that the Confucian revival is important to the future of CCP ideology,
as well as the discourse surrounding modernization, globalization and Chinese cultural identity.
Daniel Bell, author of China’s New Confucianism and Professor at Qinghua University,
believes “the CCP may rename itself the Chinese Confucian Party in the next decade of two.” 228
Bell also believes that the Confucian activism presents the most fervent political and intellectual
movement in decades. Whether or not the revival will result in a re-institution of a political
Confucianism is a matter of speculation at this point. What is certain, however, is that one of
China’s oldest cultural traditions has continuously negotiated its position in society and politics
throughout China’s modern history.
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